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The Philosopher and the Developer: 
Pluralist Moral Theory and the Law of 
Condominium
JASON LESLIE*
This paper analyzes the evolving law of condominium from the perspective of the moral 
philosophy of property, focusing in particular on neo-Aristotelian value or pluralist ethics. 
By combining aspects of traditional property law, corporate law, and municipal politics, 
condominium provides a flexible tool for ownership and private land use planning. 
Condominium, however, also poses novel and unique challenges to both legal doctrine 
and the very meaning of private property. After describing and comparing the pluralist 
approach to moral philosophy of property and the approach of its main rivals—deontology 
and utilitarianism—the paper describes how condominium is understood by each approach 
and analyzes in detail current legislation and court decisions regarding condominium in light 
of these approaches.
The paper concludes that courts and legislatures have been alternating between deontological 
approaches and pluralist approaches to condominium, with a general trend in recent 
developments away from the deontological approaches and towards pluralist approaches. 
The thesis tentatively suggests that on the whole, pluralist approaches lead to more just and 
equitable results in condominium, and suggests further avenues for study.
Le présent article analyse l’évolution du droit des condominiums sous l’angle de la 
philosophie morale de la propriété et se concentre tout particulièrement sur la perspective 
néoaristotélicienne ou « éthique pluraliste ». En combinant divers aspects du droit des biens 
traditionnel, du droit des sociétés et de la politique municipale, le condominium représente 
un outil souple destiné à la propriété ainsi qu’à l’aménagement du territoire privé. Ce faisant, 
il pose de nouveaux défis singuliers tant sur le plan de la doctrine juridique qu’au niveau du 
sens même de la propriété privée. L’article expose l’approche pluraliste de la philosophie 
morale de la propriété et la compare à l’approche de ses principales théories rivales, à 
* BA (Hons) (Simon Fraser University), JD (Columbia), LLM (University of British 
Columbia), PhD Student at the University of British Columbia.
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savoir la déontologie et l’utilitarisme. Il illustre ensuite la manière dont chaque approche 
appréhende le condominium, puis analyse en détail la législation en vigueur et les décisions 
judiciaires visant le condominium à la lumière de ces approches.
L’article conclut que les tribunaux et les parlements abordent la question des condominiums 
en alternant les approches déontologiques et les approches pluralistes et que la tendance 
actuelle semble globalement délaisser les approches déontologiques au profit des approches 
pluralistes. Cette thèse tend à indiquer que, dans l’ensemble, les approches pluralistes 
aboutissent à des résultats plus justes et équitables dans le secteur des condominiums. 
D’autres pistes d’étude sont également présentées.
THE PAST HALF-CENTURY HAS SEEN RAPID DEVELOPMENT of condominium as 
a new form of land ownership. In major urban centres in Canada, the ‘condo’ is 
now a central feature of residential property ownership.1 Condominium enables 
the purchase of an affordable home that has many of the features of a traditional, 
unitary lot. However, condominium presents new and unique challenges. 
Purchasing a unit means entering into a democratic community of owners with 
mutual rights and responsibilities and sharing in the running and maintenance 
of a complex. As a new form of property, condominium raises issues about the 
1. See Douglas Harris, “Condominium and the City: The Rise of Property in Vancouver” 
(2011) 36.3 Law & Soc Inquiry 694. Harris provides an analysis of the prevalence of 
condominium in Vancouver. For an analysis on the prevalence of condominium in 
Toronto, see Gillad Rosen & Alan Walks, “Castles in Toronto’s Sky: Condo-ism as Urban 
Transformation” (2014) 37.3 J Urb Aff 289 at 289. The authors note that “Toronto has 
experienced a tremendous surge in condominium development over the last 40 years 
and especially during the last decade.” See Audrey M Loeb, Condominium Law and 
Administration, 2nd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 1999).
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nature of ownership that reflect the increasing complexity of society, its economy, 
and its legal institutions.
This article explores the connections between the condominium form and 
associated legal doctrine, on the one hand, and the moral philosophy of property, 
on the other. Until recently, most philosophical work on the moral justification of 
private property rights has focused either on utilitarian consequentialist theories 
or deontological rights-based theories. However, in recent years there has been a 
revival of interest in neo-Aristotelean “value ethics” and its potential application 
to property theory. Condominium, with its community focus and complex 
structure, provides a useful case study for examining the explanatory power of the 
neo-Aristotelean approach and comparing it with more traditional approaches.
In this regard I draw inspiration from Gregory Alexander, who along with his 
colleague Eduardo Peñalver has led a discussion to reimagine property law from a 
neo-Aristotelean perspective.2 Alexander and Peñalver outline how “value ethics” 
applies to property law generally and consider its implications for expropriation,3 
nuisance law,4 land use regulation,5 the right to exclude,6 redistribution of wealth,7 
intellectual property,8 and collective ownership in general.9 Here, I review their 
approach—which I call “pluralist property theory’’—and add to the analysis by 
applying it to condominium property. Additionally, I analyze how court and 
legislatures have addressed issues within condominium property and consider 
which moral theory aligns most closely with the results.
Part I describes the general attributes of condominium as a form of 
ownership, and outlines how it differs from more conventional fee simple 
ownership. Part II then presents an overview of the neo-Aristotelean approach, 
which I call “pluralist moral theory,”10 providing a description of this family of 
theories and comparing them to utilitarian and deontological approaches. Part 
2. See e.g. Gregory S Alexander & Eduardo M Peñalver, An Introduction to Property Theory 
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Gregory S Alexander, “The Social-Obligation 
Norm in American Property Law” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 745; Gregory S Alexander, 
“The Complex Core of Property” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 1063. See also Eduardo M 
Peñalver, “Land Virtues” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 821.
3. Alexander & Peñalver, ibid, ch 8.
4. Alexander, “The Social Obligation Norm in American Property Law,” supra note 2 at 779ff.
5. Ibid at 791ff.
6. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2, ch 7.
7. Ibid, ch 6.
8. Ibid, ch 9.
9. Gregory S Alexander, “Governance Property” (2012) 160:7 U Pa L Rev 1853.
10. “Pluralist moral theory” is different from “pluralist property theory.” Pluralist moral theory 
refers to the general theory applicable to all moral questions, whereas pluralist property theory 
is specific to the application of pluralist moral theory to questions regarding property.
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II also explores how the utilitarian, deontological, and pluralist approaches 
understand and interpret condominium. Part III applies these approaches to a 
number of complex condominium disputes. The analysis reveals that the courts 
are using deontological and pluralist approaches in their reasoning. Finally, in the 
concluding Part IV, the article suggests that pluralist moral theory can help explain 
some of the court case outcomes as well as provide a new, useful perspective 
on condominium property. It also suggests directions for further research and 
reaches some preliminary normative conclusions about the superiority of the 
pluralist approach.
I. GENERAL ATTRIBUTES OF CONDOMINIUM
Condominium legislation swept across Canada, the United States, and a number 
of other common law jurisdiction in the 1960’s,11 and is a now central feature of 
residential ownership in major urban centres in Canada.12 A recent poll suggests 
that condominium is the second-most sought after form of home ownership in 
Ontario, after detached fee simple housing.13 Condominium provides a way to 
own property in a form that is similar to a traditional detached lot, but more 
affordable and suitable for a high-density environment. It enables home ownership 
and an urban or suburban lifestyle that is more secure than renting and offers 
more flexibility than membership in a cooperative. By contrast to cooperative 
membership, each condominium unit can be financed independently and usually 
can be sold without input from the other members of the complex.
Condominium subdivides land into individually-owned “units” and 
collectively-owned “common areas.”14 A developer wishing to create a new 
condominium must first obtain government approval in a manner akin to 
obtaining approval for a regular subdivision.15 The developer then files a land 
11. Condominium legislation swept across Canada, the United States, and a number of other 
common law jurisdiction in the 1960s. See Harris, supra note 1 at 695.
12. See Harris and Rosen & Walks, supra note 1.
13. Sean Simpson, “Condos Rank as Second Most Popular Real Estate Choice for Prospective 
Ontarian Home Buyers,” Ipsos Reid (10 July 2014), online: <http://ipsos-na.com/news-polls/
pressrelease.aspx?id=6559>.
14. Under the Ontario Condominium Act, SO 1998, c 19, “condominium” describes the general 
property form, “declaration” describes the basic document that creates the condominium, and 
“condominium corporation” describes the entity that represents the owners and administers 
the property. BC’s legislation is the Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43 [SPA] and it uses 
“strata,” “strata plan,” and “strata corporation,” respectively. For most purposes these terms are 
equivalent and I will use them interchangeably unless the context requires otherwise.
15. See e.g. Loeb, supra note 1 at 2-1-2-4.
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title “declaration” that acts like a “constitution” for the development. It defines 
the “type” of condominium development,16 outlines the dimensions of each unit 
and of the common areas, sets out a schedule of the maintenance contributions 
for each unit, and provides basic rules and restrictions governing the complex.17 
The declaration also defines any “limited common property”18 or exclusive use 
areas19 in the complex. These areas are portions of the common property that are 
designated for the exclusive use of one or more unit owners, but are not part of 
those owners’ individual titles.
Once the declaration is filed, the individual unit titles are created and a 
condominium corporation is formed. Initially, the developer is the owner of all 
the individual units and the common property, and is the sole member of the 
condominium corporation. When a purchaser buys an individual unit, that person 
obtains three things: (1) title to the individual unit as defined in the declaration; 
(2) an undivided interest in the common property of the condominium along 
with an obligation to contribute to its maintenance; and (3) membership in the 
condominium corporation.20 These three items come as a package and cannot 
be separated. Both individual condominium units and common areas are 
real property for all relevant purposes.21 Ownership of a unit also comes with 
restrictions and duties specified by statute, in the declaration, and in valid rules 
and bylaws that are passed from time to time by the condominium corporation. 
Courts have an active role in overseeing the governance of the condominium, 
as rules, bylaws, and decisions of the corporation may be found invalid if they 
are unreasonable or significantly unfair.22 In Ontario, acts of the corporation 
16. In BC there are two types of plans: regular strata plans and bare land strata plans. See Mike 
Mangan, The Condominium Manual: A Comprehensive Guide to the Strata Property Act 
(Vancouver: BC Real Estate Association, 2010) at 15; SPA, supra note 14, s 1 (“bare land 
strata plan”). In Ontario, there are several different types, including “common elements 
condominiums” and “vacant land condominiums.” See Condominium Act, supra note 14, 
ss 138-44, 155-63.
17. See Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 7; SPA, supra note 14, s 244ff.
18. SPA, supra note 14, ss 1, 73-77 (“limited common property”).
19. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 7(2)(f ). Unlike the BC legislation, the Ontario Act does 
not have a defined term for exclusive use areas, but does have a similar concept.
20. Strata Title Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 2 [STA]; Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 11.
21. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 10. In Ontario the wording of section 10 makes it clear 
that both individual units and common areas are real property. In BC, SPA, supra note 14, 
s 239 states “[l]and may be subdivided into 2 or more strata lots by the deposit of a strata 
plan in a land title office.” By implication, a strata lot is legally considered “land.”
22. SPA, supra note 14, s 164; Condominium Act, supra note 14, ss 56, 58, 135.
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may also be declared invalid if they are oppressive.23 Finally, voting rights in the 
corporation are generally fixed by statute at one vote per unit.24
In Ontario, the declaration may contain certain restrictions on the nature of the 
development. In particular, a declaration may contain “conditions or restrictions 
with respect to gifts, leases and sales of the units and common interests”25 and 
“conditions or restrictions with respect to the occupation and use of the units or 
common elements.”26 In British Columbia (BC), there is no statutory authority 
for such restrictions in the strata plan. Instead, the Strata Property Act permits 
bylaw restrictions on leasing27 and “for the control, management, maintenance, 
use and enjoyment” of strata lots and common property.28 The Strata Property 
Act specifically prohibits any restrictions on selling, mortgaging, or otherwise 
transferring title to units.29
The corporation has the responsibility for managing and repairing the 
common property. The corporation also collects levies from unit owners, 
enacts and enforces policies and bylaws, and manages the financial affairs of the 
complex. While the day-to-day affairs of the corporation are run by an elected 
council, major decisions must be put to a vote of the individual unit owners and 
require majority, super-majority, or unanimous approval, depending on the type 
of decision. As a separate legal entity, the condominium corporation has the 
power to sue and be sued, as well as to enter into contracts, both with unit owners 
and with third parties. Under some circumstances, a condominium corporation 
has the power to bring an action on behalf of the members of the condominium 
corporation. In Ontario, this action requires only majority approval by the 
condominium corporation’s board of directors;30 in BC, the action can only 
be taken on a three-quarter supermajority vote of all the owners who will be 
represented in the lawsuit.31
23. Condominium Act, SO 1998, c 19, s 135.
24. Ibid, s 51; Strata Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 53. In BC, an exception may be made 
for non-residential units, which may have a different voting entitlement. See ibid, 
ss 247-48, 264.
25. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 7(4)(c).
26. Ibid.
27. SPA, supra note 14, s 141(2).
28. Ibid, s 119(2).
29. Ibid, s 121(1)(c).
30. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 23.
31. STA, supra note 20, ss 171-72.
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A condominium complex can be terminated either by vote of the owners 
or on application to court. In Ontario, a decision to terminate requires only a 
supermajority vote.32 In BC, such decisions require a unanimous vote.33 Once 
terminated, the BC legislation specifically provides that the former owners 
become tenants in common of the entire property,34 though on a court-ordered 
termination the court has the power to vary this provision.35 In Ontario, the 
legislation specifies that on termination the assets of the corporation remaining 
after all debts and claims are paid shall be distributed proportionally to the 
former unit owners.36
The condominium regime attempts to resolve the challenges of multiple 
ownership by altering traditional property rights and creating an organizational 
form that has some aspects of property co-ownership, some aspects of a business 
corporation, and some aspects of a municipal government. A strata lot comes 
with rights, duties and responsibilities that would not otherwise accompany fee 
simple title. The purchaser of a unit becomes a member of a community that 
can impose duties, levy taxes, restrict the owner’s behavior, and impinge on the 
integrity of the lot. In return, the owner participates in governing the complex.
Although it involves elements of both democratic and corporate governance, 
condominium is primarily understood as a form of property. Having reviewed 
the general features of this property form, I now turn to a review of moral theories 
of property and their application to this new model of ownership.
32. See Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 122. With regard to termination in Ontario, 
a supermajority is an 8/10 majority vote of both owners and anyone who has a claim 
registered against property in the complex.
33. STA, supra note 20, s 269, 272ff. However, recent amendments not yet in force will change 
termination to a supermajority vote. Bill 40, Natural Gas Development Statutes Amendment 
Act, 4th Sess, 40th Leg, BC, 2015, ss 37-55 (assented to 17 November 2015).
34. STA, supra note 20, s 272.
35. Ibid, s 285.
36. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 129. This implies that on termination the former unit 
owners become tenants in common over the property. See Royal Insurance Co of Canada v 
Middlesex Condominium Corp No 173 (1998), 37 OR (3d) 139, [1998] OJ No 251.
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II. MORAL THEORIES OF PROPERTY AND THEIR 
APPLICATION TO CONDOMINIUM
A. MORAL THEORIES OF PROPERTY
For many years, utilitarian and deontological approaches have dominated 
discussions on property theory.37 The pluralist approach, while it draws on 
Aristotelean ideas, is a latecomer in the modern dialogue. As such, it is useful 
to review utilitarian and deontological theory briefly, then move on to a more 
detailed description of the pluralist alternative.
Utilitarian theories postulate that one privileged metric—“utility”— alone 
has intrinsic moral value. In some theories, utility is measured in the 
subjective experience of individuals, using a variable such as happiness or 
preference-satisfaction; other theories use a more objective measure such as 
welfare or wealth.38 In either case, a utilitarian moral theory requires society to 
take whatever actions and prescribe whatever rules will maximize utility.
Utilitarianism has its roots in the political philosophies of Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill.39 In the context of modern property theory, utilitarianism 
is expressed primarily through the lens of law and economics.40 Under this lens, 
models of rational economic behavior and human interaction are applied to legal 
doctrine, either in a positive mode (to explain why the law is the way it is) or in 
a normative mode (to justify existing legal doctrine or make recommendations 
for change). Law and economics tends to favour property systems that are 
predominantly private and allow for a high degree of alienability. According to 
37. See e.g. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at xi; Margaret Jane Radin, Reinterpreting Property 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993) at 35; Jeremy Waldron, The Right to Private 
Property (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988).
38. Richard Posner distinguishes his approach from traditional utilitarianism by adopting 
“wealth” as the appropriate metric, rather than “happiness” or “preference satisfaction.” See 
Richard Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory” in The Economic Structure of 
the Law: The Collected Economic Essays of Richard Posner, vol 1 (Cheltenham, UK: Edward 
Elger Publishing, 2000) 140.
39. See Jeremy Bentham, “Security and Equality of Property” in C B Macpherson, ed, Property: 
Mainstream and Critical Positions (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978) 39; John 
Stuart Mill, “Of Property” in ibid at 75.
40. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 18. The authors state: “Thoroughgoing and systematic 
utilitarian analyses of property are largely a product of the twentieth-century movement 
known as Law and Economics” [emphasis in original]. The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy 
also notes that “utilitarianism is, in effect, the view of life presupposed in most modern 
political and economic planning, when it is supposed that happiness is measured in 
economic terms.” See Simon Blackburn, The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd revised ed 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008) at 490-91 (“utilitarianism”).
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these theories, such property systems are the most likely to lead to the greatest 
amount of overall wealth or preference satisfaction because resources will tend to 
end up in the hands of those who value them the most.41
Where utilitarian theories ground moral reasoning in a one-dimensional 
metric, deontological theories ground moral reasoning in a privileged rule or set of 
rules about how individuals ought to behave. In the case of property, this is most 
often expressed in terms of a privileged moral right or set of rights that command 
respect from others and impose restraints on their behaviour.42 For most such 
theories, rights are individualistic. Only a person has rights; collectives do not 
have rights per se, although the recognition of individual rights may give rise 
to collective obligations or privileges. Moreover, the consequences of particular 
actions, rules or systems on the aggregate utility or welfare of individuals are of 
either secondary or of no importance. A potential change in property rights may 
lead to an overall increase in aggregate utility, but if that change violates the rights 
of some of the parties in the system, it cannot be justified.
Deontological theories about property are often linked to John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant.43 Locke postulated a natural right to private property in the 
products of one’s own labour; Kant saw private property as essential to promoting 
individual freedom. Jeremy Waldron usefully describes a rights-based theory for 
private property as one that “takes some individual’s interest (or the interests of 
some or all individuals severally) as a sufficient justification for holding others 
(usually governments) to be under a duty to create, secure, maintain, or respect 
an institution of private property.”44 In particular, this definition helpfully 
distinguishes right-based theories from utilitarian theories: “[u]tilitarian 
arguments do not count as rights-based because they do not usually regard 
individual interests taken one-by-one as political justifications for anything.”45
Pluralist theories, unlike utilitarian and deontological theories, do not attempt 
to identify a fixed, single value or set of values to underlie all moral reasoning. 
Instead, pluralist theories accept that moral questions are irreducibly complex 
and involve an open-ended set of revisable and context-sensitive human values. 
Rather than providing formulae that can resolve all moral issues, pluralist theory 
41. Harold Demsetz, “Toward a Theory of Property Rights” (1967) 57:2 Am Econ Rev 347.
42. It is also possible to frame deontological moral theories in terms of duties rather than rights. 
However, most property theory has been examined in terms of rights. See Waldron, supra 
note 37 at 64ff.
43. See extended discussion in Waldron, supra note 37. See Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 
for discussions of Locke and Kant.
44. Waldron, supra note 37 at 87.
45. Ibid at 89.
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sets up a framework for identifying and debating moral questions. It envisions 
moral discourse as an ongoing conversation and a process of discovery rather 
than as the application of fixed principles.
However, pluralist theory need neither collapse into moral relativism, nor 
accept that morality is just politics and the posturing of interest groups. The 
theory can take seriously the idea that there are objective limits to moral reasoning 
that apply universally. At the same time, pluralist theory can recognize that moral 
questions sometimes involve complex interactions of incommensurable human 
values that may not always have one fixed, objectively verifiable answer.
The main forerunner of the modern pluralist movement is the American 
pragmatist John Dewey.46 Modern proponents include Alasdair MacIntyre47 and 
Martha Nussbaum48 (the latter in the form of a “human capabilities” approach to 
morality). In the area of property, Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver have 
adopted a form of Nussbaum’s approach,49 and both Hanoch Dagan and Joseph 
Singer have presented theories that are pluralist in outlook.50
While these pluralist theories have their differences, it is possible to identify 
four key elements. Not all pluralist theories have all of these elements, nor are 
there any necessary and sufficient conditions for a theory to be a pluralist theory. 
Nevertheless, these key elements are common to many pluralist theories, and one 
would be hard pressed to consider a theory that does not have most of them to be 
pluralist. The four elements are:
• Reference to an umbrella concept such as “human flourishing” or 
another similar idea to describe the overall purpose of a moral system;
• Incorporation of an open-ended and revisable list of 
incommensurable human “values” that both constitute and 
promote the overall purpose;
• Recognition of the interdependence of individuals and community, 
to the point that the interests of the community as a whole 
carry moral weight in addition to that of the individuals in 
the community; and
46. See Stephen Carden, Virtue Ethics: Dewey and MacIntyre (New York: Continuum, 2006).
47. Ibid.
48. Martha Nussbaum, “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice” 
(2003) 9 Feminist Economics 33.
49. Gregory S Alexander & Eduardo Peñalver, supra note 2, ch 5.
50. Hanoch Dagan, Property: Values and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011); 
Joseph Singer, “Democratic Estates: Property Law in a Free and Democratic Society” (2009) 
94:4 Cornell L Rev 1009.
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• Adoption of a context-oriented, “practical reason” approach to 
moral questions that involves a low level of abstraction and a high 
sensitivity to particular circumstances.
Each of these elements merits a brief discussion.
1. HUMAN FLOURISHING IN PLURALIST MORAL THEORY
The notion of human flourishing derives from Aristotle.51 The phrase is a 
translation of the term “eudaimonia,” postulated by Aristotle as the ultimate 
end of the good life. While the term is sometimes translated as “happiness” or 
“well-being,” commentators generally regard Aristotle’s meaning more broadly. 
Rather than referring to a purely subjective experience, eudaimonia captures an 
overall objective state of harmony and can be applied not only to individuals but 
to entire communities and to society as a whole.52
Whereas utility is “thin,” resting on the subjective welfare of individuals, 
human flourishing is “thick,” involving both the objective and subjective, the 
individualistic and collective.53 It cannot be reduced to or explained by a single 
metric or a small set of human interests. As used by pluralist theorists, human 
flourishing is not so much a unitary concept as a rhetorical device pointing 
towards an intuitive feel for “the good.” It is meant to appeal to something deep in 
human nature: to that which gives rise to the spiritual impulse, to humanitarian 
compassion, and to a sense that there is a rich and multi-dimensional meaning 
51. See e.g. Roger Crisp & Michael Slote, eds, Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997) at 2 (“[T]he ancient greek philosopher, Aristotle… has been the main source of 
inspiration for modern virtue ethicists.”); Nussbaum, supra note 49 at 54 (stating that her 
vision of pluralist ethics, a “capabilities” approach, “need[s] to adopt a political conception 
of the person that is more Aristotelean than Kantian”); Gregory S Alexander & Eduardo 
Peñalver, supra note 2 at 80 (stating that pluralist value ethics “draws inspiration from 
the political and moral theories of Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas. Though it departs in 
significant ways from those classical theories, enough debt to Aristotle remains that we will 
sometimes refer to the theory simply as ‘Aristotelean’.”)
52. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 81. See also Carden, supra note 47 at 80. Carden 
writes: “Aristotle conceived of the virtues as means to and constitutive of human flourishing; 
that is, given the nature of man, the virtues are the key to the good life, or eudaimonia.”
53. In comparing the theories of two prominent early modern philosophers working in the 
value ethics tradition, Alastair MacIntyre and John Dewey, Carden notes that: “Dewey and 
MacIntyre come to much the same conclusion about human flourishing – that the virtues 
are constitutive of the good life, both for the individual and the community, since these are 
ultimately inseparable.” See Carden, supra note 47 at 101.
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to human life.54 As such, while philosophers can invoke human flourishing as a 
basis for moral reasoning and can theorize its contents and implications, it may 
be beyond a complete intellectual description.
Human flourishing can be interpreted as an absolute or relative concept. 
In its absolute form, as originally conceived by Aristotle, human flourishing 
provides a fuzzy but objective backdrop against which to evaluate any human 
being and any human society.55 In its relative form, as conceived by some modern 
theorists, human flourishing does not have an objective content that applies to all 
persons and all societies, but instead is relative to culture.56
2. VALUES IN PLURALIST MORAL THEORY
Reasoning directly from human flourishing to any particular result is impossible. 
Instead, moral reasoning in the pluralist tradition is mediated through values that 
capture a specific dimension of human flourishing and render it more precise 
in a given context. No single value can encapsulate all of human flourishing. 
Moreover, values are incommensurable: they cannot be reduced to or defined 
in terms of one another, nor can they be placed in a fixed hierarchy. This is the 
crux of the pluralist critique of both utilitarianism and deontology. Following 
Aristotle, pluralists generally maintain that ethical reasoning, and thus values, 
arise from the practice of ethical behavior and use of values within a specific 
54. Alexander & Peñalver note that “[f ]lourishing is an irreducibly complex concept that 
is constituted by numerous plural and incommensurable goods.” They also point out 
that “Aristotle recognized that there is disagreement about what constitutes happiness 
(flourishing), and he dismisses several plausible candidates, including pleasure.” See 
Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 81. MacIntyre, with some religious overtones, posits 
human flourishing as the goal of human existence or the reason for its being, while Dewey 
ties the notion of human flourishing to a complex biological and evolutionary process of 
growth. See Carden, supra note 47 at 98-101. For an interesting take on value ethics that 
uses the analogy of physical health to provide a basis for understanding human flourishing, 
see Sam Harris, The Moral Landscape: how science can determine moral values (New York: 
Free Press, 2010).
55. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2.
56. Eduardo Peñalver has expressed sympathies with the relativist approach. See Eduardo M 
Peñalver, “Land Virtues” (2009) 94:4 Cornell L Rev 821 at 866 (adopting a view consonant 
with the cultural relativism of Alasdair MacIntyre).
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context.57 The need for a contextual approach that incorporates the complexities 
of human life takes a front seat in their reasoning.58
Alexander and Peñalver note that “the values… are plural and 
incommensurable” and that it is not generally possible to compensate adequately 
for a lack of any value by an excess of another value.59 Hanoch Dagan follows 
an observation made by Isaiah Berlin that “human life is replete with competing 
values that cannot be reconciled and with legitimate wishes that cannot be truly 
satisfied. Because some values intrinsically conflict and because we cannot have 
everything we want, explains Berlin, “[t]he need to choose, to sacrifice some 
ultimate values to others, turns out to be a permanent characteristic of the 
human predicament.”60
Importantly, the list of values is open-ended. Pluralist theorists do not 
expect a final list of values exhausting the possibilities of moral consideration. 
Instead, they rely on the notion of ‘human flourishing’ to help identify the values 
applicable in any particular situation, and remain open to adding, refining, and 
developing those values as needed. In his description of Dewey’s ethics, Stephen 
Carden notes that “[v]alues are objects or events that have been judged worthy of 
pursuit or avoidance; thus they too are dependent on the conditions leading to 
and resulting from objects or events to be enjoyed. None is universal or eternal, 
57. See e.g. Stephen Carden, supra note 47 at 60-64 (comparing MacIntrye’s and Dewey’s 
rejections of both consequentialist and deontological theories as being too inflexible 
and “rule-based”).
58. See e.g. John Dewey, “Three Independent Factors in Morals” in Jo Ann Boydston, ed, The 
Later Works of John Dewey: 1925-1953 (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 
2008), vol 5 at 288. Dewey states:
A moral philosophy which should frankly recognize the impossibility of reducing all 
the elements in moral situations to a single commensurable principle, which should 
recognize that each human being has to make the best adjustment he can among forces 
which are genuinely disparate, would throw light upon actual predicaments of conduct 
and help individuals in making a juster estimate of the force of each competing factor… 
In taking attention away from rigid rules and standards it would lead me to attend more 
fully to the concrete elements entering into the situations in which they have to act. 
59. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 90.
60. Dagan, supra note 51 at 70-71, quoting Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1969) at 1-li.
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for each is a result of particular temporal conditions.”61 This particularity enables 
legal traditions based in a pluralist notion of ethics to remain flexible and evolve 
over time. According to Dagan, “law is ‘a going institution’; it is, in John Dewey’s 
words, ‘a social process, not something that can be done [sic] or happen at a 
certain date.’ As a dynamic institution, law is structured to be an ‘endless process 
of testing and retesting’; thus understood, law is a great human experiment 
continuously seeking improvement.”62
3. INTERDEPENDENCE IN PLURALIST MORAL THEORY
Alexander and Peñalver note that Aristotle stated seven times: “a human being is by 
nature a political animal.”63 What Aristotle meant by this, and about which most 
pluralist theorists agree, is that individuals and communities are interdependent.64 
People need a well-functioning society to secure their well-being, to develop a 
sense of identity and purpose, and to grow into mature and conscientious moral 
actors. A human community obviously cannot exist without people, but at the 
same time, people cannot exist, except in a very rudimentary and coarse way, 
without a community. How people develop, how they perceive themselves, 
and how they set their goals, desires, and preferences are all heavily influenced 
by their society. Communities are not just made of people; people are made 
of communities.65
Because of this interdependence, pluralist moral theory sees individual 
and collective interests not as primarily in conflict, but as mutually reinforcing. 
61. Carden, supra note 47 at 53. See also Martha Nussbaum, supra note 49 at 41 and Gregory 
Alexander, “The Social-Obligation Norm in American Property Law” (2008-2009) 94: 
4 Cornell L Rev 745 at 765. Nussbaum describes her proposed list of capacities as values 
as being “open ended,” anticipating the need to “undergo further modification.” Alexander 
notes that: “[t]here is amble room for robust debate about exactly what capacities are the 
crucial components of human flourishing.”
62. Dagan, supra note 51 at xxi, citing John Dewey, “My Philosophy of Law” in Julius Rosenthal 
Foundation, My Philosophy of Law; Credos of Sixteen American Scholars (Boston: Boston Law 
Book, 1941) 71 at 73, 77.
63. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 80.
64. See Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 80. Alexander and Peñalver expand on Aristotle’s 
conception as follows:
Empirically, part of his meaning is that humans are social creatures and that we characteristically 
choose to live with others… Aristotle also means that we have a deeper need to be part of a 
political community within which we experience richer and more complete lives than are 
available to us either alone or within small family units.
65. See also Stephen Carden, supra note 47 at 81. Carden comments regarding Dewey and 
MacIntyre’s conception of the self:
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As noted by Alexander and Peñalver: “living within a particular sort of society, 
a web of particular kinds of social relationships, is a necessary condition for 
humans to be able to develop the distinctively human capacities that allow us 
to flourish.”66 The community does not exist solely as an instrument to advance 
the aims of the individuals within it.67 Instead, the health and flourishing of the 
community as a whole is itself a matter of direct moral concern.68 Furthermore, 
the cultivation of values can only happen in a functioning society. An individual 
must be educated so that moral sensibilities, the faculty of reason, and virtuous 
action can be learned.69 It is therefore part of the moral project to see that 
individuals are shaped properly, in ways that promote values and lead to human 
flourishing at both the individual and collective levels.
4. PRACTICAL REASON IN PLURALIST MORAL THEORY
The last piece of the pluralist puzzle is the Aristotlean notion of “practical reason.” 
Moral pluralism is a-formulaic. The application of values to moral questions 
For Dewey, the self is a confluence of activities taken up through its environment, especially 
its social environment. The self for MacIntyre is not isolated from society either, but immersed 
within it. It does not choose to engage in society or enter into a contract to accept its laws; 
rather, he says that the self is born within society and is constituted by recognition of 
pre-existing social relationships and the formation of new ones. The idea of the self as an 
independent substance that stands behind activity to control it is not held by either MacIntyre 
or Dewey; both philosophers agree that such a conception is illusory and damaging to healthy 
social relationships.
66. Alexander and Peñalver, supra note 2 at 88.
67. Carden concludes that for both MacIntyre and Dewey, “the virtues are constitutive of 
the good life, both for the individual and for the community, since these are ultimately 
inseparable.” Carden, supra note 47 at 101. See also Alexander, supra note 62 at 761. 
Alexander writes: “Community is constitutive of human flourishing in a very deep 
sense; perhaps community even comprises humanity (as that term is used by many 
understandings.”
68. See also Martha Nussbaum, who argues that “[t]o the extent that rights are used in defining 
social justice, we should not grant that a society is just unless the capabilities have been 
effectively achieved” (emphasis added) and “[t]o secure a capability to a citizen it is not 
enough to create a sphere of non-interference: the public conception must design the 
material and institutional environment so that it provides the requisite affirmative support 
for all the relevant capabilities.” See Nussbaum, supra note 49 at 37, 55.
69. Alexander and Peñalver, supra note 2 at 82 note the following:
Human flourishing unfolds over the course of a person’s lifetime as, supported by those around 
her, she gradually acquires the requisite skills and resources for living well. The virtues necessary 
for flourishing are not genetically endowed talents. They are dispositions that one acquires over 
time through careful cultivation, nurturing, support from families, friends, and communities. 
(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL526
cannot be reduced to a simple rule or set of rules that will resolve all potential 
cases. As Stephen Carden explains in his analysis of MacIntyre and Dewey, 
this irreducibility
runs counter to many modern ethical theories, whether classified as 
deontological or consequentialist, which begin from a focus on the individual 
and tend to emphasize theory over practice. Not so for MacIntyre and Dewey, 
who begin by focusing on organized community activities in the pursuit of 
common goods and who seek the ground for morality in human practices rather 
than in universal principles of thought.70
The identification of values and their proper application involves a complex 
process of reasoning that attempts to balance, reconcile, and promote relevant 
values in a particular context. The goal is not to identify one basic principle, 
but “to identify a framework for describing human flourishing that, as Martha 
Nussbaum puts it, ‘allows for a great deal of latitude for diversity, but one that also 
sets up some general benchmarks’ for evaluating the practices that prevail within 
a given society as either conducive to or inconsistent with the achievement of the 
well-lived life.”71 While there may be certain regularities that can be expressed 
as general rules of thumb,72 there is no expectation that broad rules of moral 
conduct can be applied mechanically across a wide variety of situations.
B. APPLICATION TO CONDOMINIUM
Each of these three approaches to property theory interprets and understands 
condominium differently. Indeed, the very concept of condominium is 
problematic for the utilitarian view. Utilitarianism is generally uncomfortable 
with any institution that relies on democratic means to determine, allocate, and 
define individual entitlements.73 This is because, according to utilitarian theory, 
whatever legal rule or structure maximizes aggregate utility is what should be 
70. Carden, supra note 47 at 57.
71. Alexander & Peñalver, supra note 2 at 88-89, quoting Martha Nussbaum, Women and 
Human Development (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2000) at 51.
72. Gregory S Alexander argues that there are “multiple ways to reconcile support of rules, 
or at least rule-like norms, with a relatively robust conception of the social-obligation norm” 
in his particular version of pluralist property theory in the property law context. See Gregory 
S Alexander, “Reply: The Complex Core of Property” (2008-2009) 94 Cornell L Rev 1063 
at 1064. See also Hanoch Dagan, who shows how a pluralist view of property could be used 
to justify a version of the numerus clausus principle despite the lack of a unitary underlying 
moral formula. See Dagan, supra note 51 at 31-35.
73. Richard Posner, “The Economic Approach to Law” in The Economic Structure of the Law: The 
Collected Economic Essays of Richard A Posner vol 1 (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 
2000) 35 at 45. Posner’s essay exemplifies this skepticism in the following passage:
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adopted. Coercive government mechanisms should be limited to those situations 
in which restricting the ability of individuals to bargain freely over their rights 
and duties will somehow increase overall utility. Classic examples involve market 
failures caused by high transaction costs or lack of access to information.74 The 
utilitarian perspective, particularly as it is used in law and economics, leads to 
the view from public choice theory75 that a coercive regulatory process governed 
through voting procedures provides opportunities for members of the group to 
enact measures strategically to enhance their personal welfare while lowering the 
Were the legal system systematically and effectively designed to maximize economic efficiency, 
the role of normative economic analysis would be very small. In fact what one observes is areas 
of the law that seem to have a powerful and consistent economic logic – for example, most 
common-law fields – and others that seem quite perverse from an economic standpoint – in 
particular, many statutory fields… So long as there remain important areas of the legal system 
that are not organized in accordance with the requirements of efficiency, the economist can 
play an important role in suggesting changes designed to increase the efficiency of the system.
 This passage prefers law that is made by a single expert, such as a judge or an economist, over 
the “perverse” economic logic often found in statutes passed by a democratic body. However, 
Posner does add the caveat that “[o]f course, it is not for the economist qua economist, to say 
whether efficiency should override other values in the event of a conflict.” (Ibid).
74. In more technical terms, classic law and economics starts with the understanding 
in microeconomic theory that a completely open and unregulated market will lead 
automatically to an equilibrium that is fully utility-maximizing. The role of government 
is thus to secure a completely free market through clear rules of ownership. Governmental 
intervention in the market itself is then justified primarily when there is “market failure” 
because the free market mechanism breaks down due to externalities or high transaction 
costs. See e.g. Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 3d ed (New York: 
Addison Wesley Longman, 2000) at 39-43.
75. James M Buchanan & Gordon Tullock, The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of 
Constitutional Democracy (Ann Arbour: University of Michigan Press, 1962). The publication 
of this book introduced public choice theory. In Encyclopedia of Governance, S M Amadae 
notes that public choice theory attempts to use economic analysis to understand the 
behaviour of collective decision-making bodies, and “incorporates the impossibility 
theorem, holding that if one starts with individuals’ preferences, it is impossible to achieve 
any collective expression of the public good or public interest.” See S M Amadae, “Public 
choice theory” in Mark Bevir, ed, Encyclopedia of Governance (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE 
Publications, 2007) at 765.
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aggregate utility of the group overall.76 Utilitarians also tend to be skeptical about 
the costs of democratic mechanisms as a whole, maintaining that at small scales 
such as the condominium, such costs outweigh any possible utility gains from 
the resulting decisions.77
The deontological approach fares better for condominium than the 
utilitarian, at least as a description of existing condominium law. In particular, 
two ideas that flow from deontological theories work well with condominium: 
a contractarian approach to rights and duties within the condominium complex, 
and a rigid approach to the substantive property rights of condo unit owners.78
The contractarian aspect arises particularly in the formation of the 
condominium and the setting of initial responsibilities and entitlements on the 
purchase of a unit. A decision to purchase a condominium unit can be seen 
as a decision to enter into a multilateral contract with the other unit owners 
in the complex. The rights and duties that accompany the purchase then flow 
from what the purchaser theoretically agreed to in the declaration. Courts 
and legislatures that adopt this approach favour laws that make changes to the 
declaration difficult. They also consider the rights and duties of the owners to 
flow primarily from the declaration, and the resolution of disputes to centre on 
interpreting the owners’ original agreement.
To complement the contractarian analysis, deontological approaches resort 
to substantive ideas about property rights. According to these approaches, courts 
and legislatures can import rules governing other forms of property directly into 
the condominium context without further analysis. Any adjustments to property 
76. Henry Hansmann, “Condominium and Cooperative Housing: Transactional Efficiency, Tax 
Subsidies, and Tenure Choice” (1991) 20:1 J Leg Stud 25 at 34. Noting that the interests of 
unit owners may diverged, Hansmann observes that:
As a consequence, there will be substantial room for outcomes that do not maximize the 
aggregate surplus of the occupants. This might occur, for example, when the preferences of the 
median member are different from those of the mean, or when an unrepresentative coalition 
achieves dominance in collective decision because their opportunity cost of time is low or 
because they are otherwise strategically positioned to dominate the decision-making process. 
77. Hansmann, supra note 77 at 34-36.
78. For commentators focusing on protection of purchaser expectations, see Patrick A Randolph 
Jr, “Changing the Rules: Should Courts Limit the Power of Common Interest Communities 
to Alter Unit Owners’ Privileges in the Face of Vested Expectations” (1997-1998) 38:4 Santa 
Clara L Rev 1081. See also Terrell R Lee, “In Search of the Middle Ground: Protect the 
Existing Rights of Prior Purchasers in Common Interest Communities” 111:3 (2006-2007) 
Penn St L Rev 759. For an approach focusing more on traditional property rights, see 
Cathy Sherry, “How Indefeasible is Your Strata Title? Unresolved Problems in Strata and 
Community Title” (2009) 21:2 Bond L Rev 159.
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doctrine that might help to accommodate the particularities of condominium 
should be done sparingly, if at all, and only to the extent necessary to protect 
property rights. On this view, appeals to the needs of a community or to 
maximizing aggregate welfare are irrelevant.
Pluralist moral theory works differently from utilitarian and deontological 
approaches. Where the latter two attempt to provide strict rules or formulae to 
determine the “best” or “correct” decision in any given case, the pluralist approach 
provides an overall framework for moral discussion. Rather than privileging any 
particular value, rule, or metric, pluralist moral theory expects that there will be 
multiple, incommensurable values at play in any given moral situation, and that 
the best moral decision (if there is one) will be the one that reconciles the various 
interests. The theory will also consider the interests of both individuals and the 
community as deserving moral weight.
In the context of condominium, pluralist moral theory anticipates a careful 
and complex weighing, balancing, and reconciling of the interests of individual 
unit holders, the condominium complex as a whole, and possibly of sub-groups 
within the condominium. While such a theory could value utility, contractual 
freedom and obligation, and the potential wisdom to be found in traditional 
property concepts, it would not be confined to such considerations. Additional 
values such as community harmony, adaptation to changes over time, collective 
purposes and intentions, and personhood considerations have a role to play.
Moreover, pluralist moral theory would support a weaker standard of 
judicial review for condominium corporation decisions than either deontological 
or utilitarian theories. Under the pluralist model, enacting a new rule or 
resolving a dispute engages a complex process of reconciling disparate values 
rather than seeking the one “correct” solution. The deliberative, democratic, 
and community-based process of discussion and voting, when it works well, 
is conducive to this process. It is not seen as a game that individuals attempt 
to rig in their favour, or a forum through which the mob can trample on the 
entrenched rights of others. Instead, the democratic process can be understood 
within pluralist theory as a good way to take a “first crack” at resolving issues 
by taking the interests and needs of all interested parties into account through 
voting and dialogue. The courts need only intervene when the system breaks 
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down and some important value or perspective is sidelined or overpowered 
by the majority.79
III. A MORAL THEORETIC ANALYSIS OF CONDOMINIUM 
DISPUTES
With the foregoing analysis of the condominium form and its relationship 
to moral theory in mind, it is now useful to review specific issues and cases. 
Condominium disputes bring out the differences among the three approaches 
in sharp detail. In this Part, I review several situations in which Canadian courts 
and legislators have grappled with property issues in condominium, in contexts 
that highlight and further illuminate these differences: the availability of the 
oppression remedy, the right to sue in relation to common property, restrictions 
on leasing, and dissolution of condominium.
A. COMMON PROPERTY AND THE OPPRESSION REMEDY
Condominium property includes “common property,” areas that are held and 
maintained in common by all unit owners through the condominium corporation. 
Usually the common property will include exterior structural elements as well as 
grounds, hallways, and common facilities. The design of such elements can have 
a major effect on both the common areas and individual units within the condo. 
Often, these features have different impacts on different unit owners. In theory, 
the individual purchase price of a condominium lot should reflect the advantages 
or disadvantages of that particular lot. If that is the case, then any difference 
between lots should be of no particular concern on either deontological grounds 
that the purchaser agreed to the bargain or utilitarian grounds that the purchase 
was economically efficient. However, the situation is often more complicated due 
to the close-quarters living in many condominium complexes, the lack of full 
79. Some attempts have been made to address collective property forms such as condominium 
in “mixed” terms, combining utilitarian, deontological, and other considerations, without 
explicitly adopting a “pluralist” or “value ethics” label. See Hanoch Dagan & Michael A 
Heller, “The Liberal Commons” (2001) 110:4 Yale LJ 549 (referring throughout to both 
“economic and social gains” from collective ownership); Amnon Levahi, “Mixing Property” 
(2008) 38:1 Seton Hall L Rev 137 at 141-42 (explicitly avoiding a “single normative 
agenda (such as promotion of efficiency, liberty, or equity)”). Both of these articles focus 
on the structural elements of collective property ownership and consider moral or ethical 
justifications piecemeal. Whether these approaches could be considered pluralist, or simply 
pragmatic, is question for further research and debate.
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fore-knowledge on the part of the buyers, the possibility of mistakes, and the fact 
that condominium complexes are constantly changing.
Sterloff v Strata Plan VR 2613 involved a dispute over the use of parking 
garage doors. The complex was mixed-use commercial/residential with a large 
underground parking area accessible through doors from the east or west. The 
units immediately above the east door were residential; the units immediately 
above the west door were all commercial, with residential units above the 
commercial units. Both doors were industrial-grade parking garage doors that 
were not intended for use in residences.
Sterloff, an owner of one of the east units, complained about the noise from 
the door, particularly at night. The door had been out of service when he purchased 
his unit, so he was surprised by the noise when the door was repaired. Sterloff 
requested the strata corporation to replace the door with a lighter, residential 
door, at a cost of at least $12,500. The corporation refused, and instead made 
some minor structural adjustments and restricted use of the east door to prevent 
entering (but not leaving) the parking lot through it at night. These steps reduced 
but did not eliminate the noise, and caused increased use of the west door, which 
led to complaints from the residents above that door.
The court rejected Sterloff’s claim that the corporation had failed to meet its 
duty to repair and maintain the common areas. Instead, the court characterized 
the issue as a dispute over how to meet that obligation, and held that the proper 
forum for resolving the dispute was the democratic condominium process, stating:
Pursuant to its bylaws, the strata corporation must control, manage and administer 
the common property for the benefit of all owners. It seems to me that in carrying out 
that mandate, the corporation, among other things, must endeavour to accomplish 
the greatest good for the greatest number.
…
It seems to me that if the court is to become involved in the particulars of how 
that obligation is to be fulfilled, then rights and privileges of other members of 
the corporation may be affected, and accordingly, each member of the corporation 
should be a party to the proceeding. In my view, the particulars of the method of 
performance of the obligation are more appropriately defined in a meeting of the 
corporation, not on an application for a mandatory injunction.80
The court’s statement that the corporation “must endeavour to accomplish 
the greatest good for the greatest number” appears on the surface to be a utilitarian 
approach. However, the judge never considered the costs and benefits of different 
80. Sterloff, supra note 81 at 11-12.
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garage door renovation schemes as part of an effort to achieve the greatest overall 
aggregate benefit. Instead, the court deferred to the decision of the condominium 
corporation and its democratic process. Such an approach has the greatest affinity 
with pluralist moral theory.
The scope and meaning of the “greatest good for the greatest number” 
test from Sterloff was addressed in detail by both the concurring and dissenting 
opinions in Dollan v The Owners, Strata Plan BCS 1589.81 This case is particularly 
interesting because the judgment of the trial court and those of the concurring 
and dissenting judges on the Court of Appeal provide clear examples of the 
utilitarian, deontological, and pluralist approaches.82
Dollan arose from a dispute regarding windows in a new complex. The 
marketing materials for the complex showed a bank of “01” units with windows 
overlooking Vancouver’s False Creek. However, those windows also overlooked 
the windows of the “02” units in the complex, situated below the “01” units. 
During construction, the developer changed the windows in the “01” units to an 
opaque “spandrel” style. When the purchasers of the “01” units took possession, 
they sought approval from the condominium corporation to change the windows 
to clear glass.
Renovations to the exterior windows were a “significant change” to a common 
area of the condominium, and thus required the approval of a three-quarters 
majority of the units in the complex.83 A large majority voted against the 
change–19 in favour and 54 against–so two of the “01” unit owners sued the 
strata corporation, claiming that the decision was “significantly unfair.”84
The trial judge, adopting a utilitarian approach, agreed with the “01” unit 
holders. Citing the “greatest good for the greatest number” passage from Sterloff, 
the court held that the strata had a duty to make a decision reflecting a proper 
cost/benefit analysis. In the current situation, the “01” owners had been deprived 
of their view of False Creek to provide greater privacy for the “02” owners. 
However, the privacy of the “02” owners could be protected simply by installing 
blinds. Thus, the overall “cost” of keeping the status quo was greater than the 
overall “cost” of converting the windows to clear glass. The strata corporation was 
thus required to make the change.85
81. 2012 BCCA 44 at paras 33-34, 56, 346 DLR (4th) 630, Smith JA, dissenting [Dollan].
82. The second concurring court of appeal decision did not engage in a detailed analysis, so it is 
impossible to discern which approach was being taken.
83. STA, supra note 20, s 71.
84. Ibid, s 164.
85. Dollan v Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2011 BCSC 570, 201 ACWS (3d) 836.
LESLIE,  THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE DEVELOPER 533
On appeal, the BC Court of Appeal affirmed the trial judge’s decision. 
Justices Garson and Hall wrote separate reasons dismissing the appeal, while 
Justice Smith wrote a dissenting opinion. The two concurring opinions and the 
dissent rejected the application of the “greatest good for the greatest number” test 
as the appropriate test for measuring significant unfairness. The first concurring 
opinion adopted the corporate law test for shareholder oppression. This test 
focuses on the “reasonable expectations” of the aggrieved party and asks whether 
the defending party violated those reasonable expectations by action that was 
significantly unfair.86 Based on the marketing materials, the first concurring judge 
held that the “01” unit purchasers had a reasonable expectation of clear windows 
overlooking False Creek. Thus, it was significantly unfair for the “02” unit owners 
to use their majority voting rights to thwart the “01” unit holders’ expectations. 
Presumably, this view of False Creek was reflected in the unit purchase price, and 
so the “02” unit holders were depriving the “01” owners of a property right for 
which they paid. In the concurring judge’s opinion, the strata could not block 
this property right through the democratic process.
The dissenting judge took a pluralist approach, holding that the focus of the 
analysis should not be on the reasonable expectations of the “01” unit holders, 
but on reconciling the interests in the strata as a going concern through the 
democratic process. The issue of the “01” unit holders was properly a dispute 
between those owners and the developer. As the dissent explained:
In declining the respondents’ request, the strata corporation chose to maintain 
the status quo of the building design. It was under no obligation to remedy the 
developer’s defect; it was only obliged to weigh the competing interests of all affected 
owners, including concerns about views, privacy, and the exterior appearance of the 
building, and to make a decision that was not significantly unfair to the respondents. 
That obligation was met, in my view, by putting the respondents’ request before all 
the owners for a 3/4 vote and then giving effect to the outcome of that vote.87
This passage displays two common themes of pluralist approaches: the 
need to weigh and consider multiple values and interests, and deference to the 
democratic process. Effectively, the dissent refused to convert the contractual 
expectations of the “01” unit purchasers into an in rem property right enforceable 
against the world, and instead placed a priority on the need for balancing and 
community integrity in a condominium development.
The first concurring opinion in Dollan takes a deontological approach, 
while the dissenting opinion takes a pluralist approach. A second concurring 
86. Dollan, supra note 83 at para 30.
87. Ibid at para 64.
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opinion held for the “01” owners without providing a detailed justification. The 
precedential value of Dollan is thus uncertain. The first concurring opinion makes 
several dramatic innovations by applying the corporate shareholder oppression 
test and elevating the status of the purchaser’s expectations to in rem property 
rights. It remains to be seen whether later cases will adopt these innovations.
Unlike BC, Ontario’s legislation specifically authorizes an “owner, 
a corporation, a declarant or a mortgagee of a unit owner” to bring an action 
for conduct that “is or threatens to be oppressive or unfairly prejudicial to the 
applicant or unfairly disregards the interests of the applicant.”88 This oppression 
remedy is separate from the provisions permitting a party to bring an action to 
strike down a condominium rule or bylaw for being unreasonable. In McKinstry 
v York Condominium Corporation No 472,89 the Ontario Superior Court of Justice 
held that this provision incorporated the shareholder oppression remedy from 
corporate law, stating:
Stakeholders may apply to protect their legitimate expectations from conduct that 
is unlawful or without authority, and even from conduct that may be technically 
authorized and ostensibly legal. The only prerequisite to the court’s jurisdiction to 
fashion a remedy is that the conduct must be or threaten to be oppressive or unfairly 
prejudicial to the applicant, or unfairly disregard the interests of the applicant.… 
It must be remembered that the section protects legitimate expectations and not 
individual wish lists, and that the court must balance the objectively reasonable 
expectations of the owner with the condominium board’s ability to exercise judgment 
and secure the safety, security and welfare of all owners and the condominium’s 
property and assets.90
The court’s description of the oppression remedy in McKinstry appears 
to be more flexible than that described in Dollan. While the Ontario court 
acknowledged that the oppression remedy is based on protecting legitimate 
expectations, it also specified that those expectations must be balanced against 
the corporation’s interest in the welfare and governance of the condominium. 
The court held that the owners of a unit who had been blocked from unit 
renovations were not entitled to an oppression remedy, even though they were 
halfway through the renovations when the decision was made, had received the 
building manager’s assent to the renovations, and had relied on the fact that 
interior walls were not specified in the declaration as an indication that interior 
renovations would normally be allowed. The court found that the interests of the 
88. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 135.
89. (2003), 68 OR (3d) 577, 15 RPR (4th) 181 (Sup Ct J).
90. Ibid at para 33.
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collective in noise control between units, and the fact that the renovations would 
put the owner’s living room beneath the bedroom of the unit above supported 
the corporation’s decision.
McKinstry has been frequently cited by the Ontario courts in oppression 
cases.91 In Metropolitan Toronto Condominium Corporation No 1272 v Beach 
Development (Phase II) Corporation, the Ontario Court of Appeal confirmed that 
the section 135 remedy is “similar” to the oppression remedy from corporate law, 
but did not analyze the provision in detail.92 It remains to be seen whether the 
Ontario courts will interpret the oppression remedy in the strict, deontological 
fashion applied by the concurring opinion in Dollan, or whether they will take a 
more flexible, pluralist approach as suggested by McKinstry.
B. RIGHTS TO SUE OVER COMMON PROPERTY
Disputes have also arisen over whether individual owners have a right to bring 
legal action with regard to common property. Recent decisions from Ontario and 
BC exhibit a tendency towards a deontological approach when dealing with the 
right of an individual unit owner to seek such legal redress.
The issue first arose in BC in Hamilton v Ball, a “leaky condo” case in which 
a group of owners sued another group of owners in the same complex. The 
first group claimed that the second group had engaged in improper conduct in 
attempting to arrange for repairs and renovation of the building. The plaintiffs 
originally attempted to bring a lawsuit in the name of the strata corporation 
itself, but they were unable to obtain a three-quarter membership vote to approve 
the action as required under section 171 of the Act.93 Instead, the plaintiffs 
commenced an action as co-owners of the common areas in the strata, seeking 
compensation for the damages that the second group of owners had caused to 
their individual interests in that common property.
The defendants applied to have the action dismissed on the grounds that 
section 171 provided the only vehicle for bringing an action in respect of the 
strata’s common property. The chambers judge agreed:
[T]he entire scheme of the Strata Property Act is based on the fact that strata 
properties involve collective as well as individual rights…
91. See e.g. Durham Condominium Corporation No 90 v Moore, 2010 ONSC 5301, 192 ACWS 
(3d) 1371; 1240233 Ontario Inc v York Region Condominium Corporation #852, [2009] 57 
BLR (4th) 88, 2009 CanLII 1.
92. 2011 ONCA 667, 208 ACWS (3d) 211 (where the Court of Appeal upheld the lower court’s 
decision denying a finding of oppression in that case).
93. SPA, supra note 14, s 171(2).
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It must be assumed, as the legislature has assumed, that reasonable people 
protecting their own interests and acting collectively are in the best position to 
make a decision as to whether or not a certain course of action is warranted given 
the risks and potential benefits of that course of action. In this case the plaintiffs 
having been unable to persuade their fellow owners to pursue this course of action 
against some of their former or present fellow owners must abide, in my view, 
by the decision made.94
In this view, the role of section 171 is to reconcile collective and individual 
interests. The strata is the representative of the collective interests, and the common 
property is part of those collective interests. An individual owner can influence 
the collective decision-making process through voting and other political means, 
but cannot unilaterally take charge of an issue affecting the whole complex by 
commencing litigation. The judge also cited an earlier case that applied the rule 
in Foss v Harbottle95 to strata corporations, perceiving individual units owners as 
legally separate from the strata as a whole.96
The BC Court of Appeal disagreed. Noting that the common property 
in a strata is owned in common by the individual owners, not by the strata 
corporation, the court concluded that Foss v Harbottle was inapplicable.97 Further, 
the court held that even though collective ownership of common areas is “a type 
of property unknown to the common law,” it nevertheless carries with it the 
individual right to sue for damage to the common property “as a common law 
incident of the ownership of property.”98 Only very clear language in the SPA 
could remove such a “common law incident.” On this standard, section 171 did 
not displace the individual right to sue, but simply added the possibility of using 
the strata corporation as a representative body for the individual owners’ interests.
Different concerns motivated each of these decisions. The chambers judge 
was concerned with the collective resolution of contentious issues within the 
corporation, and saw the three-quarter voting rule as a means to promote 
harmony within the community by blocking divisive court action without the 
support of a supermajority of owners. The BC Court of Appeal focused on the 
“traditional” entitlement of individual owners without considering collective 
well-being and the particular context of condominium ownership.
94. Hamilton, supra note 95 at paras 25-26.
95. (1843), 67 ER 189, 2 Hare 461 (establishing that a corporate shareholder cannot sue 
individually for a wrong done to the corporation).
96. Ang v Spectra Management Services Ltd, 2002 BCSC 1544, 117 ACWS (3d) 830.
97. Hamilton, supra note 95 at para 26.
98. Ibid at para 27.
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This case highlights the tension in condominium cases between “traditional” 
rights of property and the “new” property arrangements in condominium. The 
trial judge adopted a remedial and contextual approach to interpreting the 
rights in a condominium, which are at root creations of a statutory scheme. 
This approach resonates with pluralist moral theory because it attempts to 
balance the various interests at play in a condominium complex and considers 
the needs of the community as a whole. For its part, the BC Court of Appeal 
adopted a mechanical approach, using property concepts without tailoring them 
to condominium. This approach resonates with deontological property theory 
because it focuses on the expectations that parties bring to a conflict grounded in 
property or contractual norms, and emphasizes the owner’s rights—often at the 
expense of collective interests.
The Ontario Court of Appeal came to a more nuanced conclusion in 
1420041 Ontario Inc v 1 King West Inc.99 In this case, a company pre-purchased 
several commercial units in a condominium complex and obtained commitments 
from the developer to alter the design specifications of the individual units 
and some of the adjoining common areas as part of the purchase agreement. 
When the developer failed to meet those commitments, the company sued for 
specific performance. The developer claimed that the unit owner could not 
bring an individual claim relating to the common areas, citing section 23 of the 
Condominium Act,100 which authorizes a condominium corporation to bring legal 
proceedings on behalf of the condominium owners (although without requiring 
a three-quarter membership vote to authorize the action as in BC).
The Court of Appeal found for the unit owner, though on narrower grounds 
than those used by the BC court in Hamilton:
What s. 23 is designed to do, in my opinion, is to empower a condominium 
corporation to bring an action where there is a “common” condominium issue to be 
addressed—where, as Rosenberg J.A. put it in Wellington [at p. 19 O.R.], “the real 
injury is to the owners as a group rather than to any individual” (emphasis added). 
Such a remedy, broad as it is, is not inconsistent with the right of an individual unit 
owner to pursue contractual or other claims that are unique to the owner’s unit, 
including those touching on common elements that immediately pertain to the unit 
and that do not concern the owners as a group.101
On the surface, this decision resembles the BC Court of Appeal’s holding 
in Hamilton. The court found that the provision allowing a condominium 
99. 2012 ONCA 249, 349 DLR (4th) 97 [1 King West].
100. Supra note 14, s 23.
101. 1 King West, supra note 102 at para 21.
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corporation to sue regarding the common areas did not prevent the individual 
owner from bringing a similar action. However, unlike in Hamilton, the court 
considered the fact that the common elements at issue “immediately pertained” to 
the individual units and the owner was suing for specific performance rather than 
damages. It left the door open for a future case to decide whether a claim can be 
brought by an individual owner if “the real injury is to the owners as a group.”102
The issue of an individual owner’s right to sue has significant implications 
for the nature of property in a condominium. Curtailing the right of an 
individual owner to sue regarding common property, either absolutely or when 
the “real injury is to the owners as a group,” promotes communal stewardship 
and decision-making for the common property over the piecemeal interests of 
individual owners. It places responsibility for the common areas at the community 
level and recognizes that taking legal action has an impact on the social and 
financial integrity of the entire complex. Such an approach is readily justified 
under a pluralist theory, which demands consideration of both individual and 
community interests in determining property rights. It struggles, however, under 
a deontological approach, as it empowers the collective to interfere with the 
ability of individual owners to advance and protect their property rights.
C. LEASING RESTRICTIONS
The ability to lease condominium property to third parties has often been 
construed by the courts as a traditional incident of property ownership. At the 
same time, there has been a push by many condominium owners to restrict 
leasing of units. Lessors are often seen as less invested in the community of the 
condominium and responsible for additional costs, while investor-owners are 
portrayed as being distant from the complex and having interests at odds with 
those of owner-occupiers.103 Earlier court decisions protecting the right to lease 
have been gradually giving way to legislation and court decisions that permit 
leasing restrictions.
102. Ibid.
103. See Randy Lippert, “Governing Condominiums and Renters with Legal Knowledge Flows 
and External Institutions” (2012) 34:3 Law & Pol’y 263 at 268. Randy Lippert summarizes 
this widely-held as follows:
By their mere presence renters call into doubt the condominium ideal, which is premised 
on owners sharing and governing common spaces together in a stable ‘community.’ 
Renters are a discursive affront to the possibility of the condominium due to their 
assumed disregard for the nobility of home ownership and lack of care for property. 
LESLIE,  THE PHILOSOPHER AND THE DEVELOPER 539
The classic case in Ontario is Re Peel Condominium Corporation No. 11 and 
Caroe,104 where the condominium’s declaration restricted occupancy of each unit 
to the owner’s family. However, several unit owners leased units to non-family 
members. The condominium board attempted to evict the tenants and obtain 
an order prohibiting the owners from leasing the units. The court held that 
“[o]ne of the fundamental incidents of ownership is the right to alienate the 
property that one owns,”105 tracing the origin of this idea to the Statute Quia 
Emptores, an English law passed in 1290.106 The Condominium Act provided that 
a declaration could contain “provisions respecting the occupation and use of 
the units and common elements.”107 However, the court determined that this 
language was not clear enough to permit a declaration to contain restrictions on 
leasing an individual unit.
It is unclear why the court did not refer to another subsection in the 
Condominium Act that deals specifically with restrictions on leasing. Subsection 
7(2)(c) provides that the declaration may contain “conditions or restrictions 
with respect to gifts, leases and sales of the units and common interests.”108 In 
any event, the Court’s narrow interpretation highlights the difference between 
a deontological view and a pluralist one. On a rights-based view of property, 
restrictions on alienation or leasing are difficult to justify because they restrict 
the power and freedom of property owners. Only a strong contractarian view 
could support such restrictions. However, the court in Caroe rejected this view, 
holding that the declaration of a condominium complex could not validly create 
restrictions on leasing.
A pluralist view of property allows greater scope for leasing restrictions 
without mandating a single, blanket rule. From one perspective, restrictions 
on leasing could contribute to community well-being by promoting residential 
stability and a sense of investment in the community.109 Restrictions could also 
relieve a condominium corporation from involving absentee investor-owners 
when making decisions. However, restricting rentals reduces the options of 
individual owners. Allowing rentals could also contribute to the community by 
bringing in people whose socio-economic status makes them unable to purchase 
a unit. On a pluralist approach, these various factors could be balanced in the 
104. (1974), 4 OR (2d) 543, 48 DLR (3d) 503 (SC).
105. Ibid.
106. 18 Edw I, c 1.
107. Condominium Act, RSO 1970, c 77, s 3(2)(c).
108. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 7(4)(c).
109. See Lippert, supra note 106. Lippert discusses how negative attitudes towards condominium 
renters has turned them into a type of “other” in condominium governance.
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context of a particular complex, and a solution could be tailored to that complex. 
This approach would avoid the one-size-fits-all solution suggested by Caroe.
More recently, courts in Ontario have been moving towards such a nuanced, 
context-sensitive approach regarding restrictions on short-term leasing. In Skyline 
Executive Properties Inc v Metro Toronto Condominium Corporation No 1280, 
a condominium declaration restricted occupancy of each unit to a single family.110 
The condominium corporation also enacted rules prohibiting the leasing of units 
for an initial period of less than one year. Skyline purchased several units in the 
complex, started using them as part of its short-term hotel leasing business, and 
brought a court action to declare the leasing restrictions invalid. Breaking from 
Caroe, the court did not analyze Skyline’s application in terms of the traditional 
incidents of ownership or fundamental rights of alienation. Instead, the court 
considered whether the restrictions on leasing conformed with the provision 
in the declaration that the units were restricted to single-family residential use, 
and deferred to the corporation’s role in “balancing the private and communal 
interests of the unit holders.”111 The court upheld the leasing restrictions.
A similar situation occurred in Metropolitan Toronto Condominium 
Corporation No 1170 v Zeidan, where an individual purchased several units 
in a condominium and then leased those units to a hotel company for use as 
short-term rentals.112 The condominium declaration specified that nearly all 
units in the complex, including all those at issue in the case, were to be used 
as “residential dwelling units.” The condominium corporation enacted a 
rule prohibiting any lease for fewer than three months. The individual lessor 
challenged this rule. Again, the court did not analyze the issue in terms of the 
traditional rights of property. Instead it considered whether the rule was validly 
enacted under the Condominium Act, which requires that condominium rules 
must either “promote the safety, security or welfare of the owners and of the 
property and assets of the corporation”113 or “prevent unreasonable interference 
with the use and enjoyment of the common elements, the units or the assets of 
the corporation.”114 Rules must also be “reasonable” and consistent with the Act, 
declaration, and bylaws.115 The court held that the condominium corporation 
had demonstrated that the disruption caused by short-term tenants justified 
110. 253 DLR (4th) 656, [2001] OJ No 3512 (QL) (Sup Ct) [Skyline].
111. Skyline, supra note 113 at para 16.
112. (2001), 106 ACWS (3d) 760, 43 RPR (3d) 78 (Ont Sup Ct) [Zeidan].
113. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 58(1)(a).
114. Ibid, s 58(1)(b).
115. Ibid, s 58(2).
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taking action to restrict such leasing and that the condominium corporation 
was entitled to “considerable deference” in determining the appropriate rules for 
dealing with such disruptions.116 Again, the court upheld the leasing restrictions.
Both of these decisions on short-term leasing follow a pluralist approach. 
Rather than confining the analysis to individual property rights, both courts 
considered the character of the developments, the limited nature of leasing 
restrictions, and evidence regarding the disruption, increased costs, and altered 
nature of the community caused by the short-term rentals. The court also gave 
deference to the condominium corporation and the results of the democratic 
process. Rather than seeing these restrictions as incursions on the narrow 
property rights of individual owners, the courts saw them as enhancing the value 
of the complex and enabling the owners to create the residential community 
contemplated in the declarations.
In British Columbia, the courts were initially skeptical of restrictions on 
leasing. Earlier versions of the legislation permitted a strata corporation to limit 
the number of units in the complex that could be leased,117 but the courts held 
that the use of the word “limit” precluded an absolute restriction on leasing.118 
The courts in these cases shared the concerns in Caroe: The condominium statute 
should be strictly interpreted to favour “traditional” rights of property.
However, under the new Strata Property Act (1998) the BC legislature 
provided that a strata can prohibit all leasing of residential units,119 subject to 
several narrow exemptions for hardship,120 family members,121 and existing tenants 
when a new restriction is passed.122 The new regime in BC rejects the courts’ 
earlier “property rights first” approach. By expressly permitting prohibitions on 
most leasing activity, the legislature has enabled strata complexes to tailor leasing 
to their particular needs. Such flexibility corresponds to a pluralist vision of 
property rights, balancing the interests of individuals and community.
The exemptions are also illustrative. Each identifies a situation where 
the interests of the individual owner or tenant will generally outweigh the 
interest of the collective. The exemption for hardship recognizes that, in some 
circumstances, owners may be forced to rent out their units to make ends meet. 
116. Zeidan, supra note 115 at para 44.
117. Condominium Act, RSBC 1996, c 64, as repealed by SPA, supra note 14, s 294.
118. For a detailed summary of these cases, see Marshall v Strata Plan No NW 2584 (1996), 
27 BCLR (3d) 70 at paras 37-44, 64 ACWS (3d) 1070.
119. SPA, supra note 14, s 141.
120. Ibid, s 144.
121. Ibid, s 142.
122. Ibid, s 143.
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The exemption is not automatic, but allows an owner to apply for permission 
to lease. While the corporation “must not unreasonably refuse to grant an 
exemption,”123 it may limit its duration.124 The need to make an application, 
the deliberative process it invokes, and the specific provision that the exemption 
may be temporary suggest that the hardship provision incorporates a pluralist 
balancing of interests, with the needs of the community and the needs of the 
individual owner considered together.
The exemption for family members also involves a situation where the interests 
of individual owners are likely to outweigh the interests of the collective. Here, 
the exemption is automatic: the strata corporation cannot refuse the rental.125 
Unlike the hardship exemption, where the balancing of interests is left to the 
strata corporation (within certain limits), the balancing of interests has been done 
by the legislature. However, the exemption is narrow and supported by reference 
to the value of family integrity and harmony. While rentals to third parties are 
likely to be financially motivated, rentals to family members involve complex 
dynamics including family stability, intergenerational use of residential property, 
and continuity of asset ownership. The exemption for family members seems 
to be motivated not by a rights-based approach to property, but by recognition 
that residences are often a family asset and that the use of a strata unit within 
a family should prevail over restrictions enacted by the relative strangers living 
in the complex.
Finally, the exemption for existing tenants allows an existing lease to 
continue indefinitely after a strata complex introduces leasing restrictions.126 This 
exemption could be justified either by a deontological approach or a pluralist 
approach, and is a recognition of the importance of housing security.
D. CONDO DISSOLUTION
One area that has led to special challenges in the context of condominium is 
condominium dissolution. Dissolving a condominium complex currently 
requires an 80 per cent supermajority vote in Ontario and a unanimous vote in 
BC,127 though recent amendments not yet in force will bring BC into line with 
123. SPA, supra note 14, s 144(6).
124. Ibid, s 144(5).
125. Ibid, s 142(2).
126. SPA, supra note 14, s 143(2).
127. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 122; SPA, supra note 14, ss 269, 272ff.
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Ontario’s eight-tenths supermajority requirement.128 Interested parties can also 
apply to have the condominium dissolved by court order if the applicable voting 
threshold is not met. Douglas C Harris and Nicole Gilewicz have suggested that 
the difference between a supermajority requirement and a unanimity requirement 
for dissolution reflects different conceptions of condominium property.129 On the 
one hand, a supermajority rule “constructs property to protect its exchange value 
for the owner as investor” as it protects the right to compensation, but does not 
provide a veto over the sale.130 On the other hand, a unanimity rule “protect[s] 
the interest itself for the owner, usually as resident or occupant,” as it does 
provide a veto.131 The supermajority rule thus resonates with the utilitarian goal 
of maximizing utility or wealth and permitting coercive transactions to overcome 
holdouts. The unanimity rule, on the other hand, fits best with a deontological 
conception that promotes the freedom and rights of the individual. However, 
both jurisdictions allow unit owners to apply for a court-ordered dissolution of a 
complex when the voting threshold is not met. This opens the door for courts to 
take a context-based, pluralist approach to dissolution that balances many factors 
and considers the interests of both the individual owners and of the collective.
Royal Insurance Co of Canada v Middlesex Condominium Corporation No 173 
is particularly instructive.132 The case involved a poorly-planned condominium 
with both residential and commercial units. Royal Insurance took over the 
vast majority of the units though foreclosure proceedings and proposed a 
reorganization plan to split the complex into two separate condominiums—one 
with all the residential units and one with all the commercial units—and to 
conduct a number of repairs and renovations. Nine of the fifty-one remaining 
residential owners rejected the plan, insisting on being bought out if the 
reorganization proceeded.
Royal Insurance applied to dissolve the condominium and to implement its 
reorganization plan. It relied on section 46 (now section 128) of the Condominium 
128. Bill 40, Natural Gas Development Statutes Amendment Act, 4th Sess, 40th Parl, British 
Columbia, 2015, ss 37-55 (assented to 17 November 2015).
129. Douglas C Harris & Nicole Gilewicz, “Dissolving Condominium, Private Takings, 
and the Nature of Property” in B Hoops et al, eds, Context, Criteria, and Consequences 
of Expropriation (The Hague: Eleven, Forthcoming 2015). On changing conceptions 
of condominium property generally, see ”Douglas C Harris, “Anti-Social Behaviour, 
Expulsion from Condominium, and the Reconstruction of Ownership” (2016) 54:1 
Osgoode Hall LJ 53.
130. Ibid at 41.
131. Ibid.
132. (1998), 37 OR (3d) 139, 155 DLR (4th) 94 (CA) [Royal Insurance].
(2017) 54 OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL544
Act, which authorizes the court to dissolve a condominium complex if the 
termination “would be just and equitable” and to include in the termination 
order “all provisions that it considers appropriate in the circumstances.” 
By proceeding this way, Royal Insurance attempted to circumvent the general 
rule that, upon termination of a condominium, the entire property is converted 
into a tenancy in common.
The trial judge refused to grant the order. On appeal, the majority held 
that the relief sought by Royal was not authorized by section 46. The majority’s 
reasoning was grounded in concerns about “forc[ing] the objecting respondents 
to become unit owners in one of these new condominiums,”133 and in the view 
that the power to alter individual property rights would require clearer legislative 
authority than the residual power to make supplementary orders on dissolution 
found in (then) subsection 46(3).
The dissent took a broader view. It reviewed the underlying interests and 
concluded that Royal’s plan was reasonable, better than the status quo, and had 
the potential to revitalize the complex:
Because of the fairly recent development of the condominium concept, no body of 
law has developed around the problems which will inevitably become increasingly 
frequent and diversified as facts warranting termination arise. With considerable 
foresight, the legislation has provided the court with a very broad discretion under 
s. 46(3) to act as it considers appropriate in the wide variety of fact situations which 
could arise on termination. The order requested in this case is clearly in the interest 
of all owners, and it would be unfortunate for all if a very small number of dissenters 
could frustrate the carrying out of a beneficial proposal endorsed by almost all of 
the unit owners.134
Without court approval, Royal Insurance and the forty-three owners who 
supported the plan had two options: buy out the dissenters, who were likely to 
attempt to secure greater than fair market value for their units; or apply for a 
classic dissolution, after which the entire property would be in the hands of the 
previous owners as tenants in common. The dissenting judge concluded that 
neither of these alternatives was fair or realistic.
The judges in the majority grounded their decision firmly in deontological 
concerns. For them, ordering the holdout owners into the restructuring plan 
would force them to accept a change in their property rights without consent. 
The majority was not prepared to allow such a change without a clear statutory 
mandate. Despite the merits of the proposed reorganization, the logic of property 
133. Royal Insurance, supra note 135 at 146-47.
134. Ibid at 145-46.
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rights required the court to uphold the ability of the holdout owners to refuse 
reorganization regardless of the consequences.
By contrast, the dissent looked beyond the bare logic of property to consider 
what made sense in this particular situation. Considering that the condominium 
form was a relatively new development that marked a significant change from 
common law estates, the dissent accepted that the termination provisions allowed 
broad leeway to fashion remedies that were context-sensitive and not bound to 
traditional conceptions of property. Despite the fact that the termination order 
would alter property rights, the dissent would have sanctioned the reorganization 
plan as being in the best interests of the entire complex.
The dissent in Royal can be understood from either a pluralist or utilitarian 
perspective. For a utilitarian, this case presented a classic holdout dilemma in 
which a small minority of interested parties hold up a decision that will likely 
increase aggregate utility. Requiring the holdouts to conform to the restructuring 
plan would likely be the most efficient decision. From a pluralist standpoint, the 
case demonstrates a situation where asserting rights under a traditional property 
rule was unlikely to promote the overall flourishing of the community. Unless 
the holdout owners could demonstrate some specific human value protected 
by withholding consent that countered the interests of the other owners in 
protecting their investment and revitalizing the complex, the interests of the 
other individuals and the greater community should have prevailed.
Royal involved an unusual situation. Issues regarding dissolution usually arise 
when some, but not all, of the owners in a complex want to accept a buy-out offer 
from a developer. Often, such offers are greater than what could be realized on 
individual sales of the units. Harris and Gilewicz suggest that these cases pit the 
“owner as investor” who is interested in realizing the greatest economic benefit of 
the property, against the “owner as resident” who is interested in protecting the 
integrity of his or her home and neighbourhood.135
Two recent cases from BC present an instructive contrast in this regard: 
Mowat v Dudas136 and McRae v Seymour Village Management, Inc.137 These cases 
involved the rare “common law” condominium, formed not under condominium 
legislation but through a complex series of covenants and other title restrictions. 
In practice, the complexes were run similarly to statutory condominium, with 
common areas managed by a central corporation in which every individual had a 
membership. The dispute in both cases involved a proposal supported by a group 
135. See Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 132.
136. 2012 BCSC 454, 215 ACWS (3d) 230 [Mowat].
137. 2014 BCSC 714 at para 3, [2014] BCJ No 766 [McRae].
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of owners to sell the whole complex to a developer for an amount in excess of 
what could be obtained if each unit was sold individually.
Mowat concerned Cypress Gardens, a complex in North Vancouver with 
177 units situated on 9.5 acres. A development company approached the owners 
of Cypress Gardens with an offer to buy the entire complex for a sum that it 
claimed was greater than the aggregate market value of the separate units. Some 
of the owners wished to sell, but a substantial number refused. Those wanting to 
sell brought an application under the Partition of Property Act for an order forcing 
the sale of the entire property.
The BC Supreme Court determined that only the owners of 54 of the 177 
units wanted the sale—less than one-third of the total. Further, a large number 
of owners vigorously opposed the sale, and offered many different reasons for 
their opposition. While the petitioners claimed that the complex was in a state 
of disrepair and that the owners could not afford the necessary renovations, the 
respondents claimed that a credible plan was in place to finance and undertake 
the repairs. Many respondents also questioned whether the proposed sale price 
was adequate, and wanted to see a democratic resolution to the issue rather than 
a court-ordered sale. Other owners opposed the sale because of their investment 
in the community, because they were elderly or disabled and did not want the 
hassle of moving, because they had small children who would be displaced by a 
move, or because the amount offered would not enable them to buy replacement 
housing in North Vancouver close to their schools and workplaces. Additionally, 
owners with outstanding mortgages argued that they would have to pay heavy 
mortgage penalties.
The court refused to grant the order for sale. Orders under the Partition 
of Property Act are discretionary and enable judges to consider a wide range 
of factors in determining whether an order is just and appropriate under the 
circumstances.138 In its reasons, the court considered a combination of factors, 
some of which have deontological overtones and some of which are more 
pluralist. On the deontological side, the court considered that when most of the 
owners purchased their units, they did not understand the difference between a 
“common law” condominium and a statutory condominium, and likely expected 
that dissolution or sale of the entire complex would have to follow a democratic 
procedure such as the process laid out in the Strata Property Act.139 Purchasers 
138. Mowat, supra note 140 at paras 141-46.
139. Under the current Act, voluntary cancellation of a strata plan requires unanimous consent 
from all the owners. See SPA, supra note 14, s 272.
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would have assumed that they were buying a piece of real estate that could not 
just disappear under a court application by their neighbours.140
On the pluralist side, the court considered the many interests of the 
individuals opposed to the sale. In particular, the court recognized the hardship 
of breaking up friendship networks, the problem of leaving families in a position 
where they would have difficulty finding replacement homes, and the special 
needs of the elderly and disabled people in the complex. Finally, the court noted 
that well under half of the owners were in favour of the sale, and it seemed unfair 
to displace the large majority of the owners in the complex against their will.
While there are some deontological concerns in the court’s reasoning—
especially regarding the expectations of the unit purchaser regarding the means 
of dissolution—the main thrust of the decision is a pluralist balancing act, 
considering the many different factors put forward by the parties and seeing the 
complex not merely as a collection of property rights but as a community with 
families, elderly people, and people with illnesses and disabilities. In part, this 
is a function of the Partition of Property Act and the discretionary nature of the 
remedy it affords. However, under this discretionary power the court may focus 
on the reasonable expectations of the parties, or on the best way for the owners 
to secure a financial benefit from their investment. The court chose not to focus 
on either consideration, and instead considered the individual circumstances of 
the opposed owners along with their connections to the community in Cypress 
Gardens and to North Vancouver generally.
McRae provides a useful contrast to Mowat. The case involved a similar 
application under the Partition of Property Act, brought by owners of units who 
wanted to sell the complex to a developer for a significant premium above the 
individual unit value.141 The petitioning owners were concerned that the complex 
was in a state of disrepair and that there was no agreement on raising the funds 
necessary for renovations. The objecting respondents cited reasons similar to 
those raised in Mowat: connection to the community, hardship from being 
forced to move, and concern that similar housing could not be purchased for the 
price offered by the developer. The principal difference between the Mowat and 
McRae was that in McRae, over 90 per cent of the owners favoured the sale. This, 
combined with the deadlock on renovations, enabled the court to distinguish 
140. On this point, the court seems to be misguided. There is a mechanism for court-ordered 
dissolution under the SPA that is similar to an application for partition and sale under the 
Partition of Property Act, SBC 1998, c 43, s 284.
141. McRae, supra note 141.
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the case from Mowat.142 The court found that the large majority of owners who 
wanted to realize as much as possible on their investments and purchase new 
homes could not fairly be blocked by the handful who wanted to stay.
It is tempting to see these two cases as representing the two approaches 
described by Harris and Gilewicz: Mowat protecting the interests of the owners 
as residents, and McRae protecting the interests of owners as investors. However, 
a careful reading of the cases reveals that there is more going on here. The main 
difference between the two cases is the percentage of owners who supported 
the sale. If the goal were absolute protection of the owners as residents, then 
the detailed analysis of the individual owners’ situations in Mowat would be 
unnecessary—the mere fact that unanimity could not be achieved should 
be dispositive. Similarly with McRae, if the goal were simply to promote the 
investment value of the properties, then the raw percentage of willing owners 
would not be relevant; rather, the court should have asked simply whether a sale 
of the whole complex would provide the best return on the owners’ investments. 
By making the percentage of owners who agreed to the sale the main concern, 
the courts leaned towards a pluralist moral view of property, and in particular, 
towards deference to the democratic will of the large majority of owners and their 
vision of the community in the complex.
Perhaps the most informative situation would be a case where there is only a 
simple majority in favour of a sale, not a super-majority. In such a case, the court 
would not have an overwhelming mandate from the owners as to whether or 
not the property should be sold, but rather would be faced with two substantial 
factions of owners with opposing positions. The factors a court would consider 
on such an application, and in particular those it would consider to be the most 
important or relevant, could give even greater insight into whether the courts 
take a truly pluralist approach.
In both Mowat and McRae, the legislative voting threshold for voluntary 
dissolution of a condominium was not at issue because both developments 
were common law condominium. Nonetheless, the courts came to the same 
result that would obtain under BC’s incoming 80 per cent supermajority 
requirement.143 Further, under the new legislation, any voluntary dissolution of 
a strata with 5 units or more must be approved by court order. The court has 
discretion to grant or refuse the order and must consider “the best interests of the 
owners,” the probability of significant unfairness to owners and creditors, and 
142. Ibid at para 40.
143. Bill 40, supra note 131.
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“significant confusion and uncertainty in the affairs of the strata corporation or 
of the owners.”144
These amendments were a response to a recent British Columbia Law 
Institute report that questioned the unanimity requirement, noting that it is 
“out of step with trends in strata legislation across Canada and elsewhere.”145 The 
report recommended amending the Strata Title Act to require only an 80 per cent 
vote, citing fairness to the majority of unit owners as a major concern:
[I]t is possible to question the fairness of requiring unanimous consent of the owners 
to termination of a strata. Maintaining a unanimous consent requirement holds 
out the possibility—maybe even the likelihood—that an overwhelming majority 
of owners will be thwarted by a minority, which may be as small as one owner.146
According to the report, this recommendation was “strongly supported by 
respondents to the consultation paper.”147 The report also recommended that 
all voluntary dissolutions be subject to court approval, in part as a means of 
protecting dissenters against an unfair sale.148 It remains to be seen how the courts 
will interpret the new provisions. They may interpret their discretion narrowly, 
overturning an 80 per cent vote in favour of dissolution only when there was a 
flawed process or an egregious case of substantive unfairness against the dissenting 
owners. However, the language of the statute does require consideration of 
broad factors such as the best interests of the owners, significant unfairness, and 
significant confusion and uncertainty in the affairs of the strata. The shift to a 
supermajority requirement, as well as the need to obtain a discretionary court 
order, open the possibility of a shift away from a rigid rights-based approach to a 
more flexible and context-sensitive pluralist approach.
IV. CONCLUSION: JUDICIAL TRENDS AND THE BENEFITS 
OF A PLURALIST APPROACH
Condominium creates many challenges. The foregoing review of legislative and 
judicial solutions to these challenges highlights varying ways to respond. The idea 
that condominium is a new property form that requires new ways of thinking is 
a recurring theme. While the logic of property is engaged, especially as regards 
144. Ibid, ss 48, 52.
145. British Columbia Law Institute, Report on Terminating a Strata (Vancouver: British Columbia 
Law Institute, 2015) at 54.
146. Ibid.
147. Ibid at 55.
148. Ibid at 79ff.
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individual ownership, there are repeated references to the community of owners 
and to the need for that community to manage the complex and operate through 
the logic of common interests and democratic governance.
No single theory of property dominates. However, there are several trends. 
First, utilitarian approaches have not gained much traction. This is hardly 
surprising. Utilitarian approaches to property rights, especially as interpreted 
in the law and economics tradition, sit uncomfortably with condominium. The 
tradition emphasizes free alienability of property and the allocation of resources 
though the market. By importing ideas of democratic governance into property, 
condominium destabilizes the content of property rights, reduces the ability of 
owners to bargain freely, and enables owners to pursue their interests through a 
coercive regulatory mechanism.
In deciding condominium cases, the courts do not embark on a 
wealth-maximizing, cost-benefit analysis. Decisions regarding the right to sue 
individually for damage to common areas are founded on common law property 
concepts. They do not analyze whether such actions are utility-maximizing149 
and may consider whether the “real injury” is to an individual owner or to 
the community without a utility analysis.150 In their article on forced sales in 
condominium, Harris and Gilewicz note that while the results in these cases 
could be supported by an efficiency analysis, the language of the judicial opinions 
“suggests there is more at stake in these conflicts than the efficient allocation of 
property interests” and that the interests of the owners in their homes “were not 
to be thought of primarily in terms of fungible, transferable objects of value, but 
rather as a means to secure autonomous and fulfilling lives embedded within 
community.”151 Similarly, the court decisions on leasing restrictions either 
prohibit such restrictions on the basis that the right to lease is a traditional 
incident of property152 or defer to the democratic decision making process.153 
None of the decisions consider utility maximization.
Moreover, one of the major recommendations made by law and economic 
scholars is absent. Ellickson has proposed a “regulatory takings” rule for 
condominiums, under which any action that decreases the economic value of 
a unit, such as a bylaw restriction or a re-designation of exclusive-use common 
149. Hamilton, supra note 95; see discussion supra notes 95-101.
150. 1 King West, supra note 102. See discussion supra notes 102-105.
151. Harris & Gilewicz, supra note 132.
152. See e.g. Peel Condominium Corp v Caroe (1974), 4 OR (2d) 543, 48 DLR (3d) 503 (SC) 
[Caroe]; see discussion supra notes 107-112.
153. Skyline, supra note 113; Zeidan, supra note 115. See discussion supra notes 113-119.
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property, would give the owner of that unit a claim for compensation.154 Such a 
rule would ensure that any decision produces an increase in overall utility; if it did 
not, then the cost to compensate the “losing” owners would be high enough to 
deter the “winning” owners from enacting it. However, there are no provisions 
in either the BC or Ontario legislation to require or even permit a “regulatory 
takings” regime within condominium. In the recent comprehensive reviews of 
both legislative regimes, there is no mention of a regulatory takings regime.155 It 
would appear that policy makers, the courts, and the public in general do not 
consider such a regime to be appropriate for condominium.
Second, there is a gradual trend away from deontological approaches and 
towards pluralist approaches. This is especially true in the context of leasing 
restrictions and dissolutions. In the case of leasing restrictions, the strict 
prohibition originally endorsed in Caroe156 was later modified by a pluralist 
approach that permits leasing restrictions resulting from reasonable deliberations 
by the condominium corporation.157 In BC, the courts originally resisted 
restrictions on leasing; however, legislative amendments have clarified that 
restrictions on leasing are permissible, with a few narrow exceptions for hardship, 
family members, and existing tenants.158
For dissolutions, the older position is represented by Royal Insurance Co of 
Canada v Middlesex Condominium Corporation No 173,159 in which the Ontario 
Court of Appeal refused an innovative restructuring plan for a condominium 
on deontological grounds. However, in more recent cases involving offers for 
sale in “common law” condominium, the courts are coming to a more flexible 
view, balancing a range of interests and factors in determining whether to grant 
petitions for dissolution.160 Also, as discussed in the previous part, the BC 
legislature has recently adopted a new dissolution procedure that signals a shift 
towards a pluralist approach.
However, the courts have resisted pluralist approaches in two settings: 
determining rights to sue for damage to common areas, and applying the 
“oppression” remedy. For these situations, the courts agree with commentators 
154. Robert Ellickson, “Cities and Homeowners Associations” (1982) 130:6 U Pa L Rev 1519.
155. See discussion supra notes 150-153 and infra notes 182-193.
156. Caroe, supra note 14. See discussion supra notes 107-112.
157. Skyline, supra note 113; Zeidan, supra note 115.
158. See discussion supra notes 122-129.
159. 37 OR (3d) 139, 155 DLR (4th) 94 [Royal Insurance Co]. See discussion 
supra notes 135-139.
160. Mowat v Dudas, 2012 BCSC 454 and McRae v Seymour Village Management, Inc, 2014 
BCSC 714; see discussion supra notes 140-149.
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such as Randolph and Lee who advocate enhancing protection for the expectations 
of purchasers.161 In both Ontario and BC, the courts have interpreted the 
legislation to allow individual owners to sue for damage to common areas even 
if they cannot get approval from the strata to bring the suit in its name.162 In 
Ontario, this may be limited by a judicial caveat that an individual owner may 
bring a separate suit only where the damage to the common area has a particular 
impact on their unit. In BC, however, an individual owner or group of owners 
may unilaterally sue concerning problems with the common property in general. 
This position is at odds with a pluralist approach, because it allows owners to 
bypass the democratic process with respect to disputes over the common areas, 
raising the stakes in a condominium dispute and making harmonious resolutions 
more difficult.
The oppression remedy resonates with Randolf and Lee’s suggestion 
to protect the expectations of purchasers. While it can be a flexible doctrine, 
responsive to context and the need to harmonize various interests, the remedy 
has a deontological flavor because it is based on “reasonable expectations” and 
designed to block otherwise lawful action taken by a majority. Decisions from 
Ontario have taken the flexible approach, but the concurring opinion in Dollan 
in the BC Court of Appeal may be a harbinger of stricter decisions to come.
Third, the cases reveal divisions in attitudes towards condominium. Judicial 
opinion diverged wildly in Hamilton, Royal, and Dollan. In Hamilton, the trial 
court held that individual owners could not sue unilaterally regarding the common 
areas, emphasizing the need to promote collective management. By contrast, 
the BC Court of Appeal emphasized the traditional rights of property and the 
need for part owners to bring legal action to protect part interests. In Royal, 
the majority on appeal emphasized the need to protect entrenched rights of 
owners on a proposed reorganization, while the dissent showed a willingness to 
deviate from traditional property doctrine to ensure the viability of the entire 
complex. And in Dollan, the trial judge, one concurring judge on appeal, and 
the dissenting judge on appeal all took very different approaches, inspired by 
utilitarian, deontological, and pluralist perspectives. These different approaches 
highlight the challenges that condominium raises for property and its underlying 
philosophical justification.
I now turn to a normative argument that pluralist approaches to 
condominium lead to better results. This is principally because condominium 
requires room for democratic action in the shaping of rights and obligations, and 
161. Randolph, supra note 79.
162. Hamilton, supra note 95; 1 King West, supra note 102.
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in resolving disputes. The case law reveals that while deontological (and utilitarian) 
approaches inhibit the ability of condominium corporations or reviewing courts 
to achieve solutions, pluralist reasoning accommodates the various interests at 
stake, provides a framework to find creative ways to move forward, and respects 
the outcome of the democratic process.
Cases where judges have described the implications of the different 
approaches to one particular situation are especially instructive. In Hamilton v 
Ball, the trial judge suggested that “the entire scheme of the Strata Property Act 
is based on the fact that strata properties involve collective as well as individual 
rights.”163 The judge was concerned about the ability of one faction of unit 
owners to disrupt a difficult and costly democratic process through litigation. 
From a deontological perspective, this can look like unfair suppression of the 
property rights of owners. However, from a pluralist perspective, this restriction 
encourages democratic resolution of disputes and deters a faction of owners from 
hijacking the process. Owners opposing court action have property interests 
in the common areas as well, and if no clear consensus exists for bringing a 
court action, then the supermajority rule prevents a tiny minority, or even a 
simple majority, from imposing the cost and acrimony of litigation on the rest. 
The deontological approach taken by the BC Court of Appeal precludes these 
important considerations.
The approach taken in 1 King West,164 may strike a better balance, by requiring 
that unilateral suits regarding common property be restricted to cases where one 
owner or group of owners are especially aggrieved by the particular interests in 
the common areas. This approach gives individuals the power to take action 
when their unique interests are affected while leaving general matters to be dealt 
with collectively. Respect for autonomy, privacy, and other values that adhere 
to individuals are thus reconciled with the values of community cohesion and 
deliberative decision making.
Similar remarks apply to Royal Insurance Co.165 In that case, the majority 
refused a reorganization plan on the narrow ground that it would alter the property 
rights of a small minority of owners without their consent. And yet, condominium 
contemplates precisely that, through the democratic process of amending the 
declaration and bylaws. While not all property rights in a condominium need 
to be subject to democratic will, some certainly do. To confine the question in a 
case like Royal Insurance Co to “Does the proposed change alter property rights 
163. Hamilton, supra note 95 at para 25.
164. Supra note 155.
165. Supra note 164.
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without consent?” limits the investigation and ignores the democratic aspect 
of condominium property. The better question is, “Does the proposed change 
represent a balanced and measured solution that adequately serves the interests of 
the individual unit holders and the condominium as collective?”
Disputes such as these suggest how a pluralist approach ought to inform the 
enactment and interpretation of condominium legislation. From this perspective, 
the onus on the parties to a condominium dispute would be to name and justify 
the values served by the institution of the condominium, and then to explain 
why their proposed course of action best reconciles those values. In a situation 
such as Royal, the insurance company and the majority owners can point to 
community harmony, commercial viability, and preservation of economic value 
to advance their claim that the Condominium Act should be interpreted to permit 
the restructuring. The minority owners can point to the values served by their 
position: stability, maintenance of expectations, and autonomy. The court can 
then explicitly consider these values and make a decision that achieves a just 
result under the circumstances.
The pluralist approach could also impact the way expectations work in 
property law, and the understanding of what someone “buys into” when they 
purchase a condominium unit. While condominium could be seen as a mere 
“community of convenience,” the disputes reveal a more complex character. 
A distinction drawn by Gregory Alexander between “voluntary associations” and 
“communities” is useful here.166 “Voluntary associations” are groups that people 
freely choose to join purely to advance their individual agendas; “communities” 
are groups that people may choose or not and are held together “by shared visions 
that constitute for each of them their personal identity.”167 Many groups exhibit 
characteristics of both. The potential for disputes and the need to collaborate in 
relatively intimate settings suggest that a condominium cannot be understood 
solely as a voluntary association in which individuals combine for instrumental 
reasons only. In a residential complex, individuals literally have to live with 
each other. Purchasing a residential condominium unit involves entering into 
a community with some sense of shared purpose: to enable each unit owner to 
own, take care of, and enjoy a home in the complex.168 As well, condominium 
developments are going concerns that evolve over time. Fulfilling the purpose 
166. Gregory S Alexander, “Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and 
Community” (1989-1990) 75 Cornell L Rev 1.
167. Ibid at 26.
168. Commercial condominiums may more closely resemble a “voluntary association,” depending 
on the character of the property and the businesses located there.
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of sustaining a harmonious community may therefore require adjustments, 
mediated through democratic decision-making. A purchaser of a unit cannot 
reasonably adopt a full-fledged property expectation that all their rights will be 
frozen at the time of purchase.
In this respect, the application of the oppression remedy from corporate 
law requires particular care. While this remedy began as a flexible and equitable 
one that had regard to oppressive and unfair conduct in general, courts in 
recent decades have narrowed its application.169 An action for oppression now 
succeeds when a minority can demonstrate that they had objectively reasonable 
expectations regarding their purchase of property and those expectations have 
been violated by majority action that was significantly unfair.170 If condominium 
is to survive and flourish, the qualifiers that the expectations be “reasonable” and 
that the violations be “significantly unfair” have a lot of work to do. The pluralist 
perspective provides a suitable framework to inform that work. In particular, 
as the Ontario court stated in McKinstry, “the court must balance the objectively 
reasonable expectations of the owner with the condominium board’s ability to 
exercise judgment and secure the safety, security and welfare of all owners and 
the condominium’s property and assets.”171 Both courts and purchasers of units 
need to understand that purchasers’ expectations are only one of many values 
to be considered.
Bankruptcy and corporate restructuring is another area of law that might 
provide useful analogies or ideas for condominium. In a bankruptcy, the usual 
rights of property are suspended and the bankrupt’s assets vest temporarily in 
a trustee who liquidates or manages those assets for the benefit of creditors.172 
169. Markus Koehnen, Oppression and Related Remedies (Toronto: Thomson Carswell, 2004) 
at 84-88 (tracing the development of the “reasonable expectations” test for shareholder 
oppression to Ebrahimi v Westbourne Galleries Ltd, [1972] 2 All E R 492 (HL). See also 
David S Morritt, Sonia L Bjorkquist & Allan D Coleman, The Oppression Remedy (Aurora, 
ON: Canada Law Books Inc, 2004), ch 3 at 3-1. Morrit, Bjorkquist & Coleman state that 
“in considering applications made pursuant to the statutory oppression provisions, courts 
rely heavily on the evidence of shareholder expectations in determining whether conduct has 
been oppressive or unfairly prejudicial.”
170. 459381 BC Ltd v Strata Plan BCS 1589, 2012 BCCA 44, [2012] 4 WWR 475 [Dollan]; see 
discussion supra notes 83-89.
171. McKinstry v York Condominium Corp No 472 (2003), 68 OR (3d) 557 at 566, 127 ACWS 
(3d) 560. See discussion supra notes 83-94.
172. Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, RSC 1985 c B-3, s 5(2)-(3). Also see generally Mr. Justice 
Lloyd W Houlden, Mr. Justice Geoffrey B Morawetz & Dr. Janis P Sarra, Bankruptcy and 
Insolvency Law of Canada, 4th ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2005); Lazar Sarna, Law of Bankruptcy 
and Insolvency in Canada, revised ed (Toronto: LexisNexis, 2005) at 1-2.
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In a corporate restructuring under the Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act,173 
creditors’ rights to execute on debts are suspended while the debtor and creditors 
negotiate a restructuring under court supervision, which can result in sweeping 
changes to the debtor corporation’s legal structure, ownership, and debts.174 The 
elaborate negotiations between interested parties in such proceedings, conducted 
with the help of temporary administrators and court oversight, provide a forum 
in which to work out flexible and viable solutions. When a complex proves to 
be commercially unviable, as in Royal, or where disputes lead to acrimony and 
gridlock, a restructuring mechanism might provide the best way forward. The 
dissent in Royal recognized this and was willing to read a type of restructuring 
remedy into the residual powers of the statutory scheme. Both BC and Ontario 
provide for a court-appointed administrator to manage the affairs of a complex 
in the event that the condominium corporation cannot function.175 However, 
the administrator’s powers are limited and, in BC, the administrator may not 
take any action that normally requires a vote without first securing that vote.176 
Strengthening this approach by providing express legislative authority for a more 
complex restructuring process could prove a very useful innovation. Such an 
innovation would also promote a pluralist approach to condominium, requiring 
highly contextual solutions that incorporate direct consideration of the values 
underlying the condominium.
Both BC and Ontario have recently undertaken reviews of their condominium 
legislation. In Ontario, the review process led to a “Stage Two solutions report” 
published in September 2013,177 and after further consultation with the public, 
to a proposed Protecting Condominium Owners Act.178 The Ontario review 
focused on five areas: consumer protection, financial management, dispute 
resolution, governance, and condominium management.179 The review was 
based on seven “values” that were identified as “essential to building successful 
condo communities”: well-being, fairness, informed community members and 
173. Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 11.
174. Dr. Janis P Sarra, Rescue! The Companies’ Creditors Arrangement Act, 2nd ed (Toronto: 
Carswell, 2013).
175. Condominium Act, supra note 14, s 131; SPA, supra note 14, s 174.
176. SPA, supra note 14, s 174(7).
177. Public Policy Forum, Growing Up: Ontario’s Condominium Communities Enter a New 
Era: Condominium Act Review Stage Two Solutions Report (Ottawa: Public Policy Forum, 
September 2013).
178. Bill 106, An Act to amend the Condominium Act, 1998, to enact the Condominium 
Management Services Act, 2015 and to amend other Acts with respect to condominiums, 1st Sess, 
41st Leg, Ontario, 2015 (first reading 27 May 2015).
179. Public Policy Forum, supra note 182 at 5.
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stakeholders, responsiveness, strong communities, financial sustainability and 
effective communication.180 The reviewers emphasized that “condos are much 
more than legal entities. They are self-governing communities.”181 Recognizing 
that condominium issues are “not just legal or technical” but “often… are about 
relationships between a varied and often disparate group of interests,”182 the 
reviewers adopted “an approach based on collaboration and compromise.”183 In the 
end, the recommendations in the report focused on consumer protection through 
disclosures to buyers, protecting against fraud in condominium governance, and 
dispute resolution mechanisms, rather than on property entitlements. In fact, the 
report says little about property rights, focusing instead on the need to address 
multiple values and to create viable condominium communities with long-term 
relationships between owners.
The new Protecting Condominium Owners Act largely follows the 
recommendations in the Stage Two solutions report.184 One important change is 
the creation of a new “Condo Authority,” an arms-length administrative agency 
focused on education and dispute resolution. In particular, the Condo Authority 
includes an administrative tribunal to adjudicate a variety of condominium 
disputes, including disputes regarding the enforcement of declarations, by-laws 
and rules. The tribunal would provide a cheaper and more informal process 
than going to court. As a means of promoting harmony through the quick and 
informal resolution of disputes, the tribunal is aligned with a pluralist vision of 
property in the condominium, rather than a strict, rule-based vision that places 
property rights first.
In BC, the review of strata property legislation by the British Columbia 
Law Institute (BCLI) is ongoing. The Phase One report, published in November 
2012, identifies seven areas to be examined during Phase Two: fundamental 
changes to stratas, “complex stratas,” leasehold stratas, common property, 
governance issues, insurance issues, and land-title issues.185 As of this writing, the 
BCLI has published a report on only one of these areas, fundamental changes 
180. Ibid at 15.
181. Ibid at 10 [emphasis in original].
182. Ibid [emphasis in original].
183. Ibid [emphasis in original].
184. Protecting Condominium Owners Act, SO 2015, c 28. For a useful overview of the Act, see 
Consumer Protection Ontario, “Proposed condo changes” (8 September 2015), online: 
Government of Ontario <http://www.ontario.ca/page/proposed-condo-changes#section-1>.
185. British Columbia Law Institute, Report on Strata Property Law: Phase One, BCLI Report No 
70 (Vancouver: BCLI, 2012) [BCLI].
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to stratas.186 Fundamental changes, complex stratas, and common property are 
more likely to involve questions about the conception of property than the issues 
canvassed in the Ontario review. “Fundamental changes” refer to winding up 
and dissolution, amalgamations of strata complexes, and major changes to a 
strata plan. Complex stratas refer to multi-use strata complexes, which may have 
“residential, commercial, industrial, recreational, or other uses.”187 The review of 
common property is to be focused on “perceived uncertainties in the legislation,” 
as “despite the essential importance of common property to stratas, there appear 
to remain some basic issues concerning its character that would benefit from 
clarification.”188 The review of disputes over common areas in this article supports 
this assertion. While the BCLI review process is still at an early stage, its findings 
and recommendations are likely to engage the question of how best to understand 
property rights in condominium.
Looking to the future, it is likely that condominium will continue to 
present new challenges to traditional notions of property. One topic making its 
way through the courts at present is cigarette smoking.189 Many condominium 
corporations in both Ontario and BC have passed by-laws to prohibit smoking, not 
just in common areas or outdoor patios, but also inside individual units. Judicial 
pronouncements on whether such rules are “reasonable” or “significantly unfair” 
will arrive soon. Such cases will again require courts to consider the nature of 
property in condominium. A utilitarian approach requires a cost/benefit analysis; 
a deontological approach requires consideration of the rights of property and the 
reasonable expectations of owners upon purchase. A pluralist approach requires 
more. For smoking, this would involve considering the impacts of smoking on 
the other owners and the impacts of a smoking ban for those who want to smoke 
or are struggling with tobacco addiction. Further, a pluralist approach may not 
lead to a one-size-fits-all solution; perhaps the proximity of units, the structure 
of a complex’s ventilation system, and the general acceptance of smoking in the 
greater community are all factors to consider. The power of the pluralist approach 
is that it allows for the entire context of the matter to be taken into consideration, 
and a greater probing of the individual and communal interests at stake.
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